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584 NEALE v. HAGTHROP.
implication or operation of law; nor does that statute affect trusts of
mere personalty; (g) such uses, therefore, might be established by
parol proof, if they were not sufficiently manifest from the terms of
the deed itself, (h) Let us now, then, turn to the answers and
proofs.
Hagthrop and wife have answered jointly. She, before her
marriage with Hagthrop, obtained letters of administration on the
personal estate of her late husband John Hook; and it is in that
character only, that they are now brought here as defendants.
They say, in relation to the enumerated creditors of the late Anthony
Hook, 'that the said John Hook paid the said sums of money set
out in the assignment, so far as the creditors applied for payment of
the same; ? and again, 'that the said John Hook accordingly paid
the debts particularly mentioned therein, (that is in the deed, ) as
these defendants believe and charge. '
The first of these sentences cannot be considered as a distinct
answer to any extent; either that the debts have or have not been
paid. And the second of them amounts to no more than a decla-
ration of a belief, that they have been paid. Where the nature
of the transaction charged in the bill is such as must have been
altogether within the knowledge of the intestate, the administrator
may answer, as he is informed and verily believes; but the answer
of an administrator must always be taken as well with reference to
the reasons given for his belief, as to the nature of the subject of
which he speaks. This, however, is a broad assertion of a belief,
without giving any reasons for it; or its appearing or being alleged,
that the matter was exclusively within the knowledge of their in-
testate. In these particulars this answer is not so responsive to
the bill as to constitute an available defence.
But according to the bill and the deed, which is made a part
of the bill, John Hook undertook to pay certain debts due from
Anthony Hook; the answer to this charge must then, from the
nature of things, be such as would furnish evidence available to
Anthony Hook or his representatives; it is that the bill seeks; for,
by the deed, Anthony Hook was to be protected from the claims of
his creditors therein named; and upon John's affording that pro-
tection his title rested. In effect the bill asks, not only whether
those debts have been paid or not, but more; it requires the evi-
(g) Nab v. Nab, 10 Mod. 404; Fordyce v. Willis, 3 Bro. C. C. 587. —(h) Boyd v.
McLean, 1 John. C. C. 582.
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