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582 NEALE v. HAGTHROP.
And all John can claim, by virtue of this deed, is indemnity and
reimbursement for any money so by him advanced,
In the ordinary case of a mortgage the grantor is the actual
debtor of the grantee; and it is stipulated, that the estate conveyed
shall be absolute if the grantor fails to pay at the appointed time.
In this case the grantee undertakes to put himself in the place of
the creditors of the grantor, or to satisfy those claims, and if he
fails to do so, then, it is stipulated, that the estate conveyed shall
be void. The object of the grantor, in both cases, is the payment
of his debts; and in both, security is the object of the grantee.
That security, in equity, extends no further than complete reim-
bursement; the payment of the whole principal and interest due,
and no more, (b) There is no clause in this indenture authorizing
John Hook to sell the property, and to apply the proceeds to the
payment of the claims of the enumerated creditors; and even if
there were, it would not have destroyed the redeemable quality of
this mortgage, or the resulting use arising out of the nature of this
deed, (e)
It is alleged, that the late John Hook and his representatives
have altogether failed to pay the specified debts in compliance
with the stipulations of the deed; if so, Anthony Hook had, and
his representative now has, a right to a return of this property,
with its profits; or, at least, to redeem it on the payment of so
much as has been advanced by John Hook or his representatives
in satisfaction of those claims.
It has been urged, that there is not the least room to deduce
from this deed any thing like an implied, or resulting use to
Aphony Hook and his representatives; because, it is declared to
have been made, not only for a valuable consideration, as the pay-
ment of debts, and also of five shillings; but likewise for a good
consideration, as the natural love and affection from the father to
the son.
The doctrine of a resulting use, first introduced the notion, that
there must be a consideration expressed in the deed, or otherwise
nothing would pass, but it would result to the grantor. It is cer-
tain, however, that the rule, in relation to trusts by implication
or operation of law, is by no means so large as to extend to every
mere voluntary conveyance; and, consequently, if this deed stood
alone upon the valuable consideration of five shillings, and upon
(b) Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat. 495. —(c) Turner v. Bouchell, 3 H. & J. 106.
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