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WALSH v. SMYTH. 21
Hence it is evident, that whatever may be the nature of the
amendment, it should be so perspicuously and distinctly intro-
duced and placed upon the record as to afford the means of readi-
ly, and at once distinguishing the original bill from each one of the
amendments to it, and also of ascertaining the day when each one
of the amendments was put upon the record.
No amendment of a bill can be made without the leave of the
court, which in all cases should be applied for by petition concise-
ly stating the circumstances which render an amendment neces-
sary. Under a leave to amend, a practice has however, prevailed
here, as in England, of allowing short and apparently unimpor-
tant amendments to be made by interlineation; such as the mere
correction 0f a verbal error; the alteration, striking out, or intro-
duction of a name; (d) or the making of a single allegation, not
materially varying the general structure of the case. But the safer
and better course, in almost all eases, is to put the new matter
upon the record by a separate amended bill; in which the origi-
nal bill should be recited, no further than may be necessary to
introduce the amendment, so as to avoid impertinency; for, as on
the one hand the original perspicuity and distinctness of the record
should be preserved, without obscuration or defacement, so on the
other it is the duty of the court to discountenance as much as pos-
sible any attempt to put a suitor to unnecessary expense. Conse-
quently, under a leave to amend, the plaintiff should not be per-
mitted, as in this instance, by interlineation, to confuse the new
with the original matter; or by an amended bill to recite all the
allegations, and all the charges in the original bill, making a
complete duplicate of the record, (e)
Much has been said about the mismanagement of this case; and
it may be true, that the interests of the parties have been grievous-
ly neglected. But upon this occasion, and in this stage of the pro-
ceedings, I am not allowed to take into consideration the interests
of any one who does not complain; nor can I regard the prayer of
this petitioner farther than his rights may be injuriously affected by
the decree which has been passed.
(4) Gambril v. Lyon and others, 20 June, 1804.—HANSON, Chancellor,—On appli-
cation of the complainant, leave is given to strike out the defendant B. Lyon, as
immaterial, M. S.—1 Newland's Pra. Chan. 193; Pitt v. Macklew, 1 Cond. Chan. Rep.
67, note; M'Comb v. Armstrong, 12 Cond. Chan. Rep. 459.—(e) Willis v. Brans, 2
Ball and Bet. 228; Boyd v. Mills, 13 Ves. 86; Webster v. Threlfall, l Cond. Chan.
Rep. 67; 1 Newl. Prac. Cha. 193; 1 Monta. Dig. 297; 1 Fowl. Exch, Pra. 106;
Onge v. Truelock, 12 Cond. Chan, Rep. 332.
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