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22 WALSH v. SMYTH.
The plaintiff Robert Walsh not ask for a rehearing, and it
is perfectly manifest, that he must be fully sensible of his not hav-
ing a single shadow of a pretext to complain of having been taken
by surprise by this decree. After a lapse of thirty-three years
since the commencement of this suit by him, he surely cannot now
be allowed to say, that the decree has taken him unprepared for
the controversy; or that he could now, if permitted, obtain proof
to establish the allegations of his bill. He therefore, it is clear,
most be held firmly bound by the decree in every way whatever,
subject only to an appeal.
His alleged, that some of the defendants were dead long before
the passing of this decree. If so the suit abated as to them; and
if the plaintiff Walsh bad deemed it necessary, for his benefit, to
have had the suit revived as against their representatives he might
have done so. But since he has set the case down for hearing
without calling for a revival of it against the representatives of the
deceased defendants, he cannot now complain of the total dissolu-
tion of the injunction as to them, as it was not in their power to
have revived this suit without his consent for any purpose, (f)
But the representatives of the deceased defendants do not com-
plain of any thing, and the plaintiff having failed to establish his
case, the bill has been dismissed as to all the defendants; and thus
no one of them has been injured by the decree, or subjected to any
undue proportion of liability, or obtained any advantages not com-
mon to them all, so far as their interests may have been in any way
connected, (g)
The petitioner complains of the wrong done to his intestate;
and of the injury likely to be done to his creditors. But it is per-
fectly clear, and indeed was admitted in the argument, that this
suit having abated by the death of tie petitioner's intestate, it was
totally at an end as to all his interests; and his representative be-
ing no party to the suit cannot, in any way whatever, be bound or
affected by the decree which has been passed after that abatement.
The petitioner, therefore, can have no right to complain of the
decree in any respect, as his intestate's interests are not
by it. If it be true that the consideration of the bonds, by which
the petitioner's intestate became jointly bound with the plaintiff
Walsh, was unfounded and fraudulent, he may now avail himself
of such circumstances in any manner the law will allow, unembar-
(f) Griffith v. Bronaugh, l Bland, 548.-~(g) Mandeville v. Riggs, 2 Peters, 482.
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