Hence it is evident, that whatever may be the nature of the amendment, it should be so perspicuously and distinctly introduced and placed upon the record as to afford the means of readily, and at once distinguishing the original bill from each one of the amendments to it, and also of ascertaining the day when each one of the amendments was put upon the record.

No amendment of a bill can be made without the leave of the court, which in all cases should be applied for by petition concisely stating the circumstances which render an amendment necessary. Under a leave to amend, a practice has however, prevailed here, as in England, of allowing short and apparently unimportant amendments to be made by interlineation; such as the mere correction of a verbal error; the alteration, striking out, or introduction of a name; (*d*) or the making of a single allegation, not materially varying the general structure of the case. But the safer and better course, in almost all cases, is to put the new matter upon the record by a separate amended bill; in which the original bill should be recited, no further than may be necessary to introduce the amendment, so as to avoid impertinency; for, as on the one hand the original perspicuity and distinctness of the record should be preserved, without obscuration or defacement, so on the other it is the duty of the court to discountenance as much as possible any attempt to put a suitor to unnecessary expense. Consequently, under a leave to amend, the plaintiff should not be permitted, as in this instance, by interlineation, to confuse the new with the original matter; or by an amended bill to recite all the allegations, and all the charges in the original bill, making a complete duplicate of the record. (*e*)

Much has been said about the mismanagement of this case; and it may be true, that the interests of the parties have been grievously neglected. But upon this occasion, and in this stage of the proceedings, I am not allowed to take into consideration the interests of any one who does not complain; nor can I regard the prayer of this petitioner farther than his rights may be injuriously affected by the decree which has been passed.

(*d*) Gambril *v.* Lyon and others. 20 June, 1804.—HANSON, *Chancellor*.—On application of the complainant, leave is given to strike out the defendant R. Lyon, as immaterial, M. S.—1 Newland's Pra. Chan. 193; Pitt *v.* Macklew, 1 Cond. Chan. Rep. 67, note; M'Comb *v.* Armstrong, 12 Cond. Chan. Rep. 459.—(*e*) Willis *v.* Evans, 2 Ball and Bea. 228; Boyd *v.* Mills, 13 Ves. 86; Webster *v.* Threlfall, 1 Cond. Chan. Rep. 67; 1 Newl. Prac. Cha. 193; 1 Monta. Dig. 297; 1 Fowl. Exch. Pra. 106; Onge *v.* Truelock, 12 Cond. Chan. Rep. 332.