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190 WILLIAMS* CASE.
existence of which it may be will to recollect, although none of
them need mow be particularly noticed further than as they may be
illustrative of the analogous consequences in cases of a similar
conversion made without the consent of the owner*
Here the inquiry is as to the extent of the power of the Court
of Chancery over the property of infants. It is admitted by all,
that a guardian or trustee cannot merely as such make an absolute
and total change in the nature of an infant's estate; and also, that
the Court of Chancery can direct or sanction no alteration what-
ever, in the nature of an infant's estate, which his guardian or
trustee might not of himself lawfully make, (e) In general, the
court will not suffer the personal estate of an infant to be, in any
way, changed into real; or his real estate to be converted into per-
sonalty. For the alteration of property is as far as possible to be
avoided consistently with the idea of preserving the interests of the
proprietor, (d) But, apart from this general rule, there are many
cases in which the court will, for the manifest convenience and
advantage of the infant, direct or sanction the making of an abso-
lute purchase of real estate with his personalty, or with the rents
and profits or proceeds of his estate; and thus, in fact, convert his
personalty into realty. This, however, is never done without a
complete saving to the infant of all his rights by continuing to con-
sider, during his infancy, the property as personalty to the same
extent as before such conversion was made. Because the court
can neither do nor sanction any act which may, in its consequences,
impair the rights of the infant, or those who may claim under him,
either by altering the nature of his property; (e) or by changing his
domicil so as to cast it into a different course of succession, (f)
But in the conversion of an infant's personalty into realty, by clear-
ing off incumbrances, he being, in respect of such real estate, liable
as debtor, so that, as in fact the debtor himself pays the debt, there
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(e) Inwood v. Twyne, Amb. 417; S. C. 2 Eden, 148; Lee v. Brown, 4 Ves. 368.—
(d) Rook s. Worth, 1 Ves. 461; Ex parte Bromfield, 1 Ves., jun., 460; Oxenden v.
Compton, 2 Ves., jun., 7a, (e) Winchelsea v. Norcliffe, 1 Vern. 435; Witter v. Wit-
ter, 8 P. Will. 99; Kirk v. Webb, Prec. Chan. 84; Terry v. Terry, Prec. Chan. 273;
Mason v. Day, Prec. Chan. 319; Pierson v. Shore, 1 Atk. 480; Sergeson v. Sealey,
2 Atk, 413; Maynwaring v. Maynwaring, 3 Atk. 414; Rook v. Worth, 1 Ves. 461;
Inwood v. Twyne, Amb. 417; S. C. 2 Eden, 148; Gibson v. Scudamore, 1 Dick.
45; Oxenden v. Compton, 2 Ves, jun., 73; Ashburton v. Ashburton, 6 Ves. 6;
Ware v. Polhill, 11 Ves. 278; Ex parte Phillips, 19 Ves. 120; Webb v. Shaftsbury,
6 Mad. 100,—(f) Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Ves, 750; Potinger v. Wightman, 3
Meriv. 68; Desesbats v. Berquier, 1 Bin. 336.
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