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WILLIAMS' CASE. 191
is not nor need be any saying of his rights, (g) Nor, upon the
same ground, is there any saving of the infant's rightsf where his
personalty is applied to the keeping in repair of the edifices upon
his real estate, (h)
On the other hand there are cases in which, that which is ordi-
narily and technically considered as a part of the real estate of an
infant may be converted into personalty; that is, the timber or
mineral part of the inheritance may be sold and converted into per-
sonalty, (i) But the various kinds of perennial vegetable growth,
such as timber standing upon the land, like coal and other minerals
of which the soil itself may be, in part, composed, are, all of them,
although legally held to be, while resting in their natural positions,
a part of the realty, in many respects more properly regarded as the
mere products of the land; to be gathered as portions of the rents
and profits of the inheritance, as much so as corn, or any other of
the industrial fruits of the earth, the taking of which timber or
mineral products not being properly a conversion, but only a mode
of enjoyment and perception of the profits of the estate; (j ) and
like all rents and profits derived from the inheritance, when so taken,
must be regarded as personalty, (k) So considered the selling of
timber or coal from the land of an infant can, with no more propri-
ety, be regarded as a conversion of his real estate into personalty,
than the selling of its annual crops of grain or tobacco.
All the cases to be found in the English books which speak of
the conversion of an infant's real estate into personalty, merely for
his advantage and convenience, are cases which relate to nothing
more than the timber and mineral part of the inheritance. For it
has been distinctly declared, that there is no instance of binding
the inheritance of an infant by any discretionary act of this court;
that as to personal things, as in the composition of debts, it has
been done; but never as to the inheritance, for that would be assu-
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(g) Dennis v. Badd, 1 Chan. Ca. 156; Ex parte Grimstone, Amb. 706; Shrewsbury
v. Shrewsbury, 3 Bro. C. C. 125; S. C. 1 Ves., jun., 283; Chetwynd v. Fleetwood,
4 Bro. P. C. 435.—(h) Ex parte Ludlow, 2 Atk. 407; Ex parte Simon Degge, 4 Bro.
C. C. 238, note; Oxenden v. Compton, 2 Ves., jun., 73.-— (i) Rook v. Worth, 1 Ves.
461; Anandale v. Anandale, 2 Ves. 383; Tullit v. Tullit, Amb. 370; Ex parte Lud-
low, 2 Atk.407; Ex parte Bromfield, 1 Ves., jun., 462; S. C. 3 Bro. C. C. 510; Ox-
enden v. Compton, 2 Ves, jun., 70; S. C. 4 Bro. C. C. 281.—(j ) Chandos v. Talbot,
2 P. Will. 606; Story s. Windsor, 2 Atk. 630; Pulteney v. Warren, 6 Ves. 80; Rook
v. Worth, 1 Ves. 461; Tullit v. Tullit, Amb. 370; Oxenden 9. Compton, 2 Ves,, jun.,
70; 8,C.4 Bro. C, C. 231; Ex parte Phillips, 19 Ves. lit; Stoughton v. Leigh, 1
Taunt 402.-(k) Bertie v. Abingdon, 3 Meriv. 568.
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