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WILLIAMS' CASE 189
Thirdly The infants were quite young, and would not be capa-
ble, for many years, of taking charge of the property, Two of
them were females, and could not, even after their full age, per-
sonally and beneficially assume and direct the management of
their estates.
Fourthly. The mother and guardian of the infants was not com-
petent, by reason of her sex, her situation, and her inexperience
in business to control and supervise the conduct of either properly,
which its extensiveness, nature, and condition demanded.
And Fifthly. The property at that time would probably sell for
as much as it would at any short future period; and the commis-
sioners did not doubt, that if the proceeds were judiciously in-
vested in public stock, the surplus interest, which would remain
after the deduction of an annual sum sufficient for the maintenance
and education of the infants, would more than equal any advance
in the value of the property which coming years might bring.
Upon this report of the commissioners the case was submitted
without argument.
24tA May, 1828.—BLAND, Chancellor.—Before we proceed to
the consideration of this case, it may be well, for the better under-
standing of the whole matter, to advert to the law as it before stood,
as well as to some of the special estate acts, which the General
Assembly had been induced to pass in relation to similar cases
before the passage of the general acts under which this case has
been brought before the court.
Among the various rights which an owner may exercise over
his property is that of directing, by his contract, his will, or
otherwise, that his real estate shall be converted into personalty,
or that his personalty shall be converted into realty. This right
of conversion, however regarded at law, has long, in equity,
been held to be a well established incident to every absolute
ownership. And as equity considers that which has thus been
directed to be done as having actually been done, in every case,
except in dower; (a) it thenceforward, and, for almost all purposes,
treats the estate as being, in the eye of equity, real or personal
according to the character which its owner has thus stamped upon
it The exercise of such an act of ownership gives rise to a
variety of principles, in relation to property so disposed of, (b) the
(a) Crabtree v. Bramble, 3 Atk. 67.--(b) Doughty v. Bull, 2 P, Will, 320; Lech-
mere v. Carlisle, 3 P. Will. 211; Thornton v. Hawley, 10 Ves. 129; Ashby v. Pal-
mer, 1 Meriv. 296.
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