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142 SALMON v. CLAGETT.
But, apart from those several pounds of defence, which a defen-
dant may set forth, and rely upon in the shape of a demurrer, a
plea, an answer responsive to the bill, or an answer in negation or
avoidance of it £ there may be found at the hearing a substantial
defence arising out of the whole case which has not, in any manner,
been specially advanced and relied upon by the defendant in his
pleadings. A defendant may, in his answer, rely upon lapse of
time as a defence against a stale claim. But even if he does so, it
will not avail him if the delay is accounted for; because, in such
case, although it may be a very old, it cannot be considered as a
stale claim, (x) If, however, the claim should, in truth, be a stale
one, and the defendant should have been entirely silent, in his
pleadings, as to lapse of time; yet he may have the benefit of the
presumption of satisfaction arising from the lapse of time at the
hearing, (y) Consequently, this reliance upon an unopposed pre-
sumption is a mode of defence, which shews itself at the hearing,
upon a consideration of the whole case, and not from anything
directly alleged by the defendant.
There are then, five modes of defence of which a defendant may
avail himself, according to the nature and exigences of his case; 1,
a demurrer; 2, a plea; 3, an answer, properly so called; 4, a
negation or matter in avoidance, embodied in the shape of an
answer; and 5, a defence found at the hearing as the production
of the whole case as then presented for adjudication. Each of
these modes of defence is strikingly distinguishable from the rest;
and it is of importance, that they should, in no manner, nor in any
stage of the proceedings be confounded with each other.
It is a general rule, that a defendant who submits to answer must
answer as fully as the bill requires. If the defendant after appear-
ance fails to make any answer whatever, then process may be issued
against him for the contempt, or the bill may be taken pro confesso.
If he answers; but does so imperfectly or evasively, then, upon
exceptions taken by the plaintiff, he may be made to answer fully.
The plaintiff's remedy for an insufficient answer, if he wishes all
the material matters of his bill fully answered, is by taking excep-
tion, which brings the question before the court; whether the de-
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(x) Clifton v. Haig, 4 Desau. 341.—(y) Prince v. Heylin, 1 Atk. 494; Start v. Mel-
lish, 2 Atk. 610; Hoare v. Peck, 9 Cond. Cha. Hep. 165; Coleman v. Lyne, 4 Rand.
464; Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 498; 1 Mad. Chan, Pra. 99; The Attorney-Gene-
ral v The Mayor of Exeter, 4 Cond. Chan. Rep. 208.
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