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SALMON v. CLAGETT. 141
say whether they are true or false; and to set forth ill he knows
about them; it extends so far and no farther.
The object in calling for an answer is to serve the purposes of
the plaintiff, not of the defendant. The plaintiff calls for it as evi-
dence, and it is equivalent to parol evidence, as to all matters
where such testimony is available. But, the necessary consequence
of this position is, that since the plaintiff has called on the defen-
dant to testify, by way of answer, it is to the full extent of the call,
or so far as it is responsive to the bill, competent evidence; which
cannot be overturned by the testimony of one witness alone; and
the answer so called for is evidence to this extent, although it be
made by a defendant deeply interested, or by one who is incompe-
tent as a witness in ordinary cases; or by a corporation aggregate
under its seal without oath.
A defendant may allege any facts in his answer, as an avoidance,
which give rise to an equity that constitutes a good defence; as
payment, a release, &c.; and, however generally or darkly any
such matter may be stated, the plaintiff cannot except; because
they form no part of that response he had called for; and if such
statements are so obscure as to be of no avail, it can be of no
injury to him. The defendant alone bears the consequences of the
lame and ineffectual manner in which he puts forward his own
defence. Facts thus advanced in the answer, by way of avoid-
ance, operate, in many respects, as if they had been couched in
the form of a plea; but whether presented in the one form or the
other, they are never considered as evidence of any kind; because
the plaintiff had not, in any manner, called for them. Hence, if
the plaintiff puts in a general replication, the defendant must prove
them at the hearing, or they will be disregarded, (t) Yet if the
plaintiff sets the case down to be heard on bill and answer, or
refuses to reply, then such allegations must be received as true;
not because they constitute any part of the answer called for by
the bill; but, because the plaintiff by setting the case down on
bill and answer, or refusing to reply, has precluded the defendant
from proving them; and, therefore, by that act he makes a tacit
admission of their truth; and they are accordingly received as ad-
missions; (u) an infant plaintiff, however, can make no such ad-
missions, (w)
(t) Simson v. Hart, 14 John. 74.—(u) Barker v. Wyld, 1 Vern. 140; Grosvenor
e. Cartwright, 2 Cha. Ca. 21; Wrottesley v. Bendish, 3 P. Will. 237, n.; Wright v.
Nutt, 3 Bro. C. C. 330; Beams' Orders, 180; Forum Bom. 45; Estep v. Watkins,
1 Bland, 488.—(w) Legard v. Sheffield, 2 Atk. 377.
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