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SALMON v. CLAGETT. 143
fendant has answered as fully as he was required to do by the bill.
The determination of that question always involves the preliminary
inquiries; whether the plaintiff making the demand has the capa-
city to make it; and also, whether his case is such a one as gives
him any claim to an answer. All the deviations from this rule, that
a defendant who submits to answer must answer fully, have sprung
from the consideration of this preliminary investigation.
The plaintiff, we have seen, must, by his bill, present such a
case as falls properly within the jurisdiction of the court; and, it
must also appear, that he has a legal capacity to sue; for his tide
to sue is a part of his case which he must make out at the hear-
ing, (z) Every bill, therefore, assumes those two propositions.
But, if that should not be the case, or either of them should be
untrue, it is not indispensably necessary, that the defendant should
make the objection by demurrer, by plea, or by relying upon it in
his answer. For, although he cannot, after he has answered, have
the bill revised and divested of its impertinence; (a) yet an objec-
tion to the jurisdiction of the court, or to the capacity of the plain-
tiff may be presented in any form, or at any time; it may be made
by demurrer, plea, or answer, or it may be taken advantage of at
the hearing, (b) And so too, at law, a defendant may, on the
same grounds, demur, plead, or move in arrest of judgment (e)
It is not said, in any of the English authorities, that a denial of
jurisdiction forbids all inquiry into the nature of the case; on the
contrary, a clear understanding of it is indispensably necessary, in
order to determine, whether it be, in truth, one of which the court
has no jurisdiction. And if the fact does not satisfactorily appear
from the proceedings then, on a plea, it may be established by
proof on the trial of the plea; or upon a full disclosure, and at the
hearing. For, certainly, no court of justice, after the fact has been
shewn, and made to appear, should compel a defendant to answer,
or give relief to a plaintiff as to any matter of which it has no
jurisdiction; or where the plaintiff has no legal capacity to de-
mand and receive that which he asks, (d) These are the grounds
on which the rule is founded; and, therefore can, in no way, be
considered as exceptions to it.
(x) Newman v. Willis, 2 Bro. C. C. 147.—(a) Abergavenny v. Abergavenny, 2
P. Will. 312; Anonymous, 2 Ves. 631.—-(b) Brown v. Bradshaw, Prec. Cha, 153;
Jennet v. Bishop, 1 Vern. 184; Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. 446; Roberdeau v. Rous,
I Atk,544,—(c) 1 Chit Plea. 7 and 427.—(d) Lempster v. Pomfret, Amb. 154;
Forum Rom, 54.
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