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WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON. 537
the legislature is prohibited from declaring to be rules of law, the
judiciary cannot assume and apply, as such. These principles of
this court, by which a creditor is prevented from obtaining satis-
faction from the estate of his deceased debtor, in certain cases,
where others have been bound for the payment of the same debt,
it is evident, do, in effect, deprive the creditor of at least a part,
and very often of the whole of his security; they do most mani-
festly, in a material and essential manner, impair the obligation of
the contract; and are, therefore, in direct hostility with the gene-
ral principles of our code as taken from that of England, and with
the spirit, if not the very letter of this provision of the constitu-
tion of the United States.
But according to these principles the creditor, it is obvious,
from the very nature of things, may not merely have his security
materially cut down and grievously impaired, but altogether de-
stroyed. The explanation whether the deceased is principal or
surety, and the proof of insolvency is almost always the occasion
of embarrassment and delay. Notwithstanding which it is de-
clared, that the claims having been then barred by the statute of
limitation, as against others, forms of itself no ground for letting
the creditor in to obtain any satisfaction from the estate of the
deceased. And if it should not be barred by limitation, still the
attempt to recover satisfaction from the other joint debtors may
fail, from a variety of causes, against which no diligence of the
creditor can guard. The other debtors may be in desperate and
rapidly sinking circumstances although then not reputed to be in-
solvent. They may be residents of other states, or remote places,
from which it may be difficult or impossible to obtain correct in-
formation as to their pecuniary condition; or they may be dead
and their representatives so numerous and dispersed as that the
creditor may find it impracticable within any reasonable time, to
procure any kind of proof of their insolvent condition.
Upon the whole, I have been long satisfied, that these princi-
pies of this court in relation to the distribution of the real assets
of deceased debtors operate hardly, injuriously, and perniciously
upon the rights and interests of creditors. Yet as it appears, that
they have been steadily continued in full force for more than thirty
years past; and as I found them firmly rooted and in full vigour
when I came here, I shall therefore continue to acquiesce under
their operation; leaving it to other and higher authority to correct
the evil, if it should be so considered, in such manner as may be
deemed most proper.
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