538 WATKINS v, WORTHINGTON.

Two of these excepting creditors, however, contend that, al-
though these principles of this court may be established, they do
not apply to their cases as the holders of promissory notes which
had been endorsed by the deceased; because every endorser of such
an instrument being considered as an original maker or acceptor,
and chargeable as such, he is not merely a surety, but must be
treated as an original debtor for the whole amount. This is cer-
tainly the law in relation to such a contract; but it is not the whole
law as regards the matter under consideration.

The holder of a promissory note, or bill of exchange, which has
come to his hands through several endorsements, has a double
security; and it is a rule of law and equity, that a man may make
use of all the securities he has, until he receives satisfaction for
his whole debt. And, therefore, as to the holder, the maker, ac-
ceptor, drawer, and each endorser is, as a distinct debtor, liable
for the whole amount, and each one may be sued separately as
such, at the same time; but the court will not allow the holder to
obtain more than one entire satisfaction. It is clear, that, as re-
gards the holder, they all stand as principal debtors; but, in point
of fact and law, the several endorsers are warranters of the note
or bill, and although they may not be strictly sureties, (g) who
stand in the relation to each other of co-obligors in a joint and seve-
ral bond, entitled to contribution from each other on the failure of
their principal; yet they are, in truth, sureties standing as a series
of guarantees, all of whom pledge themselves for the sufficiency
of the maker or acceptor, and each one responsible for all who
stand before him. The primary liability resting upon the maker
or acceptor, and the drawer and each endorser liable only in a
secondary degree. Considered as sureties to this extent, and in
this order, all the doctrine respecting principal and surety applies
to their relative situation, except as regards contribution; in place
of which, each endorser, on taking up the note or bill, has a right
to stand as a creditor against every one before him as his debtor
to the full amount of the note or bill; but a prior endorser can
have no claim upon a subsequent endorser, (h)

Hence, it is clear, that these principles of this court apply as

(g) Ex parte Tonge, 3 Ves. & Bea. 39.—(A) Ex parte Wyldman, 2 Ves. 115;
Ex parte Marshal, 1 Atk. 130; Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 167; Smith v. Woodcock,
4 T. R. 691; Stock v. Mawson, 1 Bos. & Pul. 286; Walwyn v. St. Quintin, 1 Bos.
8t Pul. 662; English v. Darley, 2 Bos. & Pul. 61; Clarke v. Devlin, 3 Bos. & Pul.
3S3; Gould v. Robson, 8 East, 576; Wood v. Repold, 3 H. & J. 125.