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536 WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON.
extreme, are permitted to shake or impugn the sacred obligation of
contracts as between debtor and creditor, (d)
These rigid and inflexible principles of the English code have
always been considered as forming a part of the law of Maryland;
and have been approved and affirmed by the highest authority of
our country. The case of the British subject, whose whole pro-
perty in this country, where the debt bad been contracted, had
been seized, and confiscated with a reservation in favour of his
just creditors, presented an apparently irresistible claim on the part
of the debtor for relief, so far as to compel the creditor to seek
satisfaction, in the first instance, from the confiscated estate of his
debtor J yet after the most mature consideration it was finally held
in England, that even such a case would not warrant a court of
justice in giving such relief to the debtor as would, in effect, im-
pair the obligation of the contract, (e)
By the constitution of the United States, it is declared, that 'no
state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.' (f)
Of the history or causes of this restriction upon the legislative
power of the states, it is unnecessary here to say any thing; nor
is it necessary to speak of the kind of legislative enactments to
which it properly applies. It is sufficient, as regards the subject
under consideration, that the people, or sovereign authority of this
country, has deemed the obligation of contracts, at least as be-
tween individuals, creditor and debtor, as a matter so important
and so sacred as to be guarded by an express provision of consti-
tutional law, unalterable even by the government itself. Now if,
as it is thus declared, the legislative department cannot, by any of
its acts, impair the obligation of contracts, it surely could not be
allowed, that the judicial department should effect the same thing
by means of any judgment or decree. The judicial department
applies to particular cases only such rules as the legislature may
lay down; but the legislature is prohibited from laying down any
such rules, and therefore no such rules can be applied by the judi-
cial department.
Hence, any principles, such as these now under consideration,
the effect of which is to impair the obligation of a contract, which
(d) Stat. Acton Burnel, 11 Ed. 1; Kilty's Rep. 143; Holditch v. Mist, 1 P.
Will. 695; Wright v. Simpson, 6 Ves. 714; Folliot v. Ogden, 1 H. Blac. 123;
Wright v. Nutt, 1 H. Blac. 136; Kempe v. Antill, 2 Bro, C. G. 11; Wright v. Nutt,
8 Bro C. C. S26; Ex parte Kendall, 17 Ves. 520; 12 Westminster Review, 369,—
(e) Wright v. Simpson 6 Yes. 714.—(f) Art. 1, s. 10.
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