CORRIE'S CASE. 505

mitted, in time of peace, freely to migrate from one nation to
another, and to take with them their infant children and property,
or to have their moveables tranported any where; provided they
do so fairly and without prejudice to the state, or to any one; as
in the cases and upon the principles before explained. Whence,
it is clear, that, under the law of nations, the free removal of per-
sons and of property, from one state to another, can only be re-
strained, upon the ground of a duty of the state to itself, or to its
own citizens; and that, apart from those restrictions, no infant or
adult can be in any way hindered or embarrassed in withdrawing
his property from any other state into that of which he is a resi-
dent citizen, or within which he has his domicil.

It is universally admitted, that immoveable property of all de-
scriptions, must be regulated by the law of the state within which
it is situated. But a foreigner, or a non-resident, who may be
permitted to hold such property, must, as a necessary consequence
of that permission, be allowed to collect and have remitted to him,
its rents and profits. A living adult owner may, by a sufficiently
authenticated power, cause the rents and profits of his real estate,
or the whole of his personal estate to be transmitted to him any
where beyond the jurisdiction of the state. And by a comity,
now prevalent among all civilized nations, founded on this conces-
sion to living owners, qualified by a proper regard to itself and its
citizens, an administration granted under the law of the deceased's
domicil, is so far recognized by every other nation as to be consi-
dered as the administration in chief j to which the administration
taken out in the state where the property is found, is only auxi-
liary; and to which administration in chief, the surplus must be
handed over for the purpose of distribution. And so too, mar-
riage, if valid where solemnized, being recognized as valid every
where, vests in the husband full authority to cause his wife's per-
sonal property to be transferred to any place he may think proper.

An infant is incompetent, by reason of his infancy, to clothe any
one with a power to dispose of his property; and yet his right to
have it removed, during his infancy, is as perfect; and the be-
nefit of removal may be, and often is, much greater to him than
to an adult owner. Hence, it is laid down, that it belongs to the
domestic judge to appoint a guardian to an infant; and that the
law of nations, which has an eye to the common advantage and
the harmony of states, requires the appointment of such a guardian
to be recognized as valid in all other countries in which the infant