506 CORRIE'S CASE.

may have any concerns, (s) An administration granted abroad,
and the assignees or trustees appointed under the bankrupt or in-
solvent laws of another state, allowed to have any autho-
rity here, in order that the interests of the state and of its citizens,
may be protected. But no such reason can exist for refusing to
recognize the appointment of a guardian of a foreign infant, made
under the laws of the state to which he belongs. An infant being
incompetent to contract, or to incur debts for any thing more than
mere necessaries, the irresistible presumption is, that he can have
no creditors beyond the immediate sphere of his domicil; and con-
sequently, there can be no probability, that any of our citizens
would be at all prejudiced by allowing to a foreign infant, by his
foreign guardian, the same kind of right of removing his effects
beyond the reach of our laws, which has been so freely conceded
to a foreign adult.

But if it were held to be necessary to have the moveables be-
longing to a foreign infant, placed in the hands of a guardian
appointed here, it would be in effect, to determine that his pro-
perty should be withheld from him during the whole term of his
infancy; or at least, that it should be exposed to the great risk
and expense of a foreign management, where the extent of his
wants could not be correctly estimated, and the seasonable appli-
cation of the profits of his estate to his necessary calls could not
be made. In short, the recognition of the appointment of a guar-
dian to a foreign infant, under the law of his domicil, is a courtesy
which may be safely and readily reciprocated among nations, with-
out the slightest injury to any one, and with the greatest benefit to
infant owners every where. Therefore, the reason, the justice,
and the necessity of such cases, obviously require such a general
and mutual recognition; and that the authority of such an agent
should be every where regarded as having the same extent as the
authority of an adult owner himself, in so far as it may be neces-
sary to sue for, collect, and remove his personal estate, and the
rents and profits of his lands, without contravening the law of the
state where such land may be situated, as to the right and title
to it. (t)

(s) Vattel, b. 2, c. 7, s. 85; Kames' Pri. Eq. b. 3, c. 8, s. 1; Exparte Otto Lewis,
1 Ves. 298.—(t) Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. 75; Kildare v. Eustace, 1 Vern.
419; Ex parte Otto Lewis, 1 Ves. 298; Ex parte Annandale, Amb. 80; Cranstown
v. Johnston, 3 Ves. 170; S. C. 5 Ves. 277. In the matter of the Duchess of Chan-
dois, 1 Scho. & Lefr. 301; Cartwright v, Pettus, 2 Chan. Ca. 214.