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504 CORRIE'S CASE.
But, although the state has thus, by its constitution, withheld
from all who may be entrusted with public authority, all power
over the religious or political opinions of its citizens, infant or
adult; yet it has a large interest in having her infants educated
under the influence of that very freedom which has been secured
to them. And, therefore, the Chancellor here, as in England,
looking to his constitutional duties, in this respect, would not
suffer a guardian to send his ward abroad, or out of the United
States to be educated, where principles adverse to our institutions
must necessarily be inculcated, and might be too copiously im-
bibed, (n) And although parents of infants may well be indulged
upon the ground of their own right to leave this country at plea-
sure, to take with them their infant children wherever they may
go, (o) yet the court will not allow a father, under the colour of
his parental authority, to work the ruin of his child, or suffer the
child to be in any way sacrificed to his views; (p) nor will it con-
cede to any mere legal guardian an unlimited power to dispose of
his ward as he may think proper; since the state has a deep in-
terest in retaining and educating her own infants, with a view to
her own strength and improvement, (q) And as an infant cannot,
of himself, acquire any domicil, but always retains that of his
parents, or of his origin, so his having been left here as an orphan
devolves upon the state a right to retain him within its jurisdiction
for its own benefit, as well as for his own advantage. And there-
fore a guardian merely constituted such by law, is never permitted,
at his pleasure, to change the domicil of his ward for any purpose,
much less with a fraudulent intent to alter the rule of succession to
his property from that by which it would have been governed ac-
cording to the law of the domicil from which he was removed, (r)
According to the established principles of international law, no
one nation can, under any pretext, interfere with the internal regu-
lations or domestic concerns of another; nor can any one nation
be allowed to withdraw from another any of its citizens, to impair
its strength, or to diminish its resources in any way whatever. Sub-
ject, however, to these fundamental axioms, individuals are per-
(n) Mountstoart v. Mountstuart, 6 Ves. 363; De Manneville v. De Manneville,
10 Ves. 56; Lyons v. Blenkin, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 115; Vattel, b. 1, ch. 11, s. 114.—
(o) Lasbley v. Hog Robin. Succession, 430.—(p) Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Cox, 242.—
(g) Skinner v. Warner, 2 Dick. 779; Ex parte Warner, 4 Bro. C. C. 101; Wellesley
v. Beaufort, 3 Cond, Cha. Rep. 14; Lyons v. Blenkin, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 115.—
(r) Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Ves. 750; Potinger v. Wightman, S Meriv. 68; De-
sesbats P. Berquier, 1 Bin, 336.
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