268 CONTEE v. DAWSON.

arise, not any mere matter of opinion or idle assertion. In the case
before alluded to, (c) the party alleged; first, the validity of the
deed; second, the receipt of the money under the deed; and third,
that the intention of the deed was, that he should hold the money so
received. The two first of those allegations stated, and admitted
the truth of the facts upon which the judgment of the court was
founded; and the third amounted to no more than an expression
of the defendant's opinion of the intention of the deed, which being
erroneous, was therefore passed over unnoticed. But, although
parties may be indulged in a brief expression of their opinions as
to the law arising out of the facts they set forth; and the doing so
may, in many cases, be received as a useful indication of the ob-
jects they aim at; yet there is no absolute necessity, in any case,
to make any statement or allegation as to the legal consequences
of any facts; since it is the peculiar and exclusive duty of the court
to pronounce what is the law arising out of any combination of
facts which may be regularly brought before it. In this case,
and at present, all the allegations of fact contained in the answer
of Eleanor Dawson, must be taken to be true, as well those which
are immediately responsive to the bill, as those which introduce
new facts by way of avoidance and defence.

The petitioners, however, assuming a view of the answer, in
relation to the matter now under consideration, which they assert is
the correct one, contend, that all the admitted facts necessary to
lay a proper foundation for the desired order, are to be found in the
answer of Eleanor Dawson, except those set forth in the account
settled by her with the Orphans Court, a copy of which is exhi-
bited as a part of their petition. And that account, they urge, is
now admissible as part of the foundation of the proposed order; as
being analogous to a confirmed auditor's report; and as proof of
collateral facts within the meaning of this court's opinion in the
case alluded to. (d) Therefore, if that account should not be deemed
admissible, for that purpose, there is, even by the petitioner's own
concession, no just ground for his application, and it will be un-
necessary to notice any other matter in relation to it.

The confirmation of an auditor's report is, in every sense, a judg-
ment of the court. For although it may not constitute a part of the
final judgment on the whole case, it is nevertheless always con-
sidered as a judgment conclusive of the matter which it affirms,

(c) McKim v. Thompson, 1 Bland, 155.—(d) McKim, v. Thompson, 1 Bland, 155.