CONTEE v. DAWSON. 269

and to which it relates; with some exceptions, subject only to be
reheard or revised for similar causes, which would induce the court
to rehear or revise any other of its judgments. It has been deemed
a sufficient foundation for an order to bring money into court; be-
cause it was so conclusive as to the matter in controversy to which
it related, in that case and between those parties. But, even con-
sidering the settlement of this account, by this executrix Eleanor
Dawson, before the Orphans Court, as a judgment of that tribunal;
yet it certainly is not a judgment between the parties to this case,
upon any point now in controversy between them. Nor can it be
received as an admission in a course of judicial proceeding, in
direct reference to the matters in controversy in this case, which
the party can neither contradict or explain away at the final hearing.
It is, therefore, in no respect, analogous to a confirmed auditor's
report; and, consequently, can furnish no foundation for an order
to bring money into court.

But this account, it has been urged, is admissible as proof of
collateral facts, which, together with those admitted by the answer,
furnish a sufficient ground for the order now asked for. I have
said upon a former occasion, that the foundation for such an order
must be found in the direct progress of the case; and be such as
cannot be afterwards contradicted or explained away. Such is the
general rule; and the reason is obvious. If the court were to stop,
or to turn aside from the direct progress of the case to collect proofs,
in relation to an interlocutory order respecting any matter, which
must, according to the regular course, remain open for proof until
the case was set down for hearing, it would thus anticipate the
final hearing and decision upon the merits; and involve itself in
endless difficulties and contradictions; and be employed in acting
and re-acting for no beneficial purpose, or indeed, often in doing the
greatest injustice to the parties.

The only cases in which the court has allowed itself to depart
from this general rule, are those which arise between vendors
and purchasers. The reason why affidavits are admitted, in such
cases, to establish those facts and circumstances which are neces-
sary, in connection with the pleadings, to lay a foundation for
an order to bring money into court, has been already sufficiently
explained in a late case, (e) This is not such a case; nor is there

(e) McKim v. Thompson, 1 Bland, 155,
35 v.2