CONTEE v. DAWSON. 267

and which was found to be unambiguous; and to leave no room
for the introduction of proof as to its true intent and meaning.

It is a general rule, that a plaintiff may, at any time, without
or by withdrawing his general replication, set the case down for
final hearing, on bill and answer. But if he does so, he there-
by necessarily admits the truth of all the facts set forth in the
answer; as well those stated as directly responsive to the bill, as all
those new facts and circumstances, pertinent to the matter in con-
troversy, which have been introduced into it by way of avoidance,
or as a defence. The reason and utility of this rule are obvious.
The plaintiff cannot be permitted to deprive the defendant of the
means of sustaining his defence by proof; but if he admits the
truth of all the facts alleged by way of defence in the defendant's
answer, he does not do so. Because a defendant cannot be
expected or allowed to make his defence stronger, or better than
he himself has stated it; and, therefore, if the plaintiff admits the
truth of all those facts set forth as constituting that defence, the
defendant can have no cause to complain, nor any pretext for ask-
ing to be indulged with any further delay to the prejudice of the
plaintiff; since the collecting of proofs in such case must be alto-
gether unnecessary. (6)

So, in cases of this kind, where the order is proposed to be
grounded on the admissions of the defendant. The truth of all
the facts alleged in the answer must necessarily be conceded; be-
cause the defendant cannot have his answer garbled, or be deprived
of the means of sustaining his defence by proof, if the facts alleged
by him are denied; and because it is only by the plaintiffs' grant-
ing the truth of the facts alleged by way of defence, that it is
rendered wholly unnecessary to adduce proof; and the case be-
comes so situated, as to be susceptible of being fairly and at once
presented to the court, upon facts not liable to be contradicted or
explained away at the hearing.

From some expression which fell from the counsel, in the course
of the argument, I deem it proper, however, to remark, that in
declaring, that all the allegations of the defendant's answer, in
cases of this sort, must be taken to be true, I mean the allegations
of pertinent facts, out of which legal or equitable principles may

(6) Grosvenor v. Cartwright, 2 Ca. Chan. 21; Barker v. Wyld, 1 Vern. 140;
Wrottesley v. Bendish, 3 P. Will. 237, note; Legard v. Sheffield, 2 Atk. 377; Wright
v. Nutt, 3 Bro. C. C. 339; Beam's Orders, 29,180; 2 Ev. Potheir Ob. 137.