94 STRIKE'S CASE.

executor or bankrupt fails to object or to plead the statute of limita-
tions, it may be made or relied upon by any of the creditors; and
the validity of such objections will sometimes be directed to be
tried on an issue at law.(k)

In this State, similar principles have been held, and sanctioned
in the case of William Sluby's estate :—in that case, Chancellor
Hanson observes, in speaking of the liability of the real estates
sf deceased persons to be sold for the payment of their debts,
under the act of 1785, ch. 72, that " no mode is prescribed by the
act for establishing the debts. It is left entirely to the Chancellor's
d^cretion. But, (he observes,) it is a rule to admit claims on
such proof as is prescribed for, and is satisfactory to an Orphans
Court; and even to admit claims passed against an executor or
administrator by an Orphans Court, unless objected to by some
person interested, viz. by a creditor of the deceased, or his executor
or administrator; or by the guardian of the infant." The chan-
cellor then goes on to speak of the manner in which such objec-
tions should be tried; and in substance declares, that he would not
direct an issue at law for that purpose, but in extraordinary cases.(1)

There can be no difference, in point of equity, between the case
of a creditor's bill against a deceased person's estate, and a creditor's
bill, as in this instance, against an insolvent's estate. Therefore,
upon principle and authority, it is competent for these originally
suing creditors to make these objections, and to rely upon the
statute of limitations, in opposition to these claims of the other
creditors who have come in since the institution of this suit. But
in applying the statute of limitations in such cases, it must be with
all its saving provisoes; and also subject to the resuscitating quali-
fications of such acknowledgments as are deemed sufficient to take
a case out of the statute; of which a statement in an insolvent's
schedule may be considered as one, where the claim and schedule
agree. And the statute, as in other cases, must be allowed to
commence its operation from the time the debt accrued; and to
run on until the creditor came in, by filing his petition, or the
voucher of his claim.

The plaintiffs, by their bill, found their claim against the defend-
ants, upon contracts made with Henderson & Rogers; and the

(k) Exparte Dewdney, 15 Ves. 407; Jolliffe v. Pitt & Whistler, 2 Tern. 694;
Gifford v. Hart, 1 Scho. & Lefr. 409; Civil Code Napol. art 2225.—(I) Ringgold
v. Jones, ante, 88, note; Edmondson v. Frazier, ante, 02, note; Shewen v. Vander
horst, 1Russ. & Myl. 347; S. C. 2 Russ.& Myl 75.