STRIKE'S CASE. 93
be conceded on all hands, that these originally suing creditors have
an interest in these real assets; but, yet it is urged, that they can-
not make such objections as these against the claims of their fellow
creditors. This matter must be determined by practice, on prin-
ciple, and on authority.
The defendants, or the representatives of deceased debtors, are
generally, from strong motives of interest, so very active in their
opposition to all and each of the creditors, where opposition can
avail, that they rarely leave any thing to be said or done by any
one else; and hence, it would seem, from the practice of the court,
that they were the only persons who had any right to urge such
objections. It is obvious, therefore, that the main current of the
practice here is not likely to be very fruitful of information on
this subject.
There is a class of creditors' bills common in England, but of
rare occurrence here, which will cast light upon this matter. Bills
are often brought there by one creditor in behalf of himself and
others, against executors to obtain payment, and to have the assets
brought in and administered under the directions of the Court of
Chancery, (k) In such cases the executor is not bound to plead the
statute of limitations; and if he does not, the creditors will have
a decree, and be paid. But it is the constant course, in the mas-
ter's office, to take the objections against other creditors, and to
exclude from distribution those, who, if legal objections are brought
forward, cannot make their claims effectual. So too, in cases of
bankruptcy—if the bankrupt waives any objection, it may still be
made by the creditors; and the reason of this is, that the creditors
have a direct and manifest interest in the funds, and that it should
satisfy their whole claims respectively. If each of them was not
permitted to make these objections, they would be left at the mercy
of those, for a full defence, who, in all cases, where the fund is not
more than enough to pay all the debts, have no interest in exclud-
ing any one from partaking, to their prejudice, in the distribution,
however ill-founded his claim may be. And besides, such pro-
ceedings in chancery, are only to be considered as other modes of
compelling payment; and the Chancellor is understood, in the dis-
tribution, to govern himself as to legal debts by the rules of law;
and as to equitable debts, by the rules of equity, regarding the
claim of each creditor as a suit depending; and hence, if the
(k) I Mad. Chan. 578.
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