STRIKE'S CASE. 95

decree of May, 1822, recognises and affirms their claims of that
description; and the proofs derived from competent witnesses,
will enable the auditor, in fulfilment of that decree, to refer to the
notes and vouchers, to ascertain the amount, and to compute the
interest thereon.

But, if would be altogether without precedent to allow a plaintiff
to split up his claim into parcels, and to bring separate suits for
each, or after he had obtained a decree to add to the amount, and
to eke out his claim indefinitely, by introducing other particulars,
and causes of action of a different description, not mentioned
or alluded to in the pleadings, or sanctioned by the decree, and
which were only noticed in the depositions of some of the wit-
nesses; or to bring in any additional claim by a mere ex parte
petition, filed after the hearing and decree. If the plaintiffs had
other claims than those mentioned in the pleadings, subsisting at
the time of filing their bill, which might have been included
therein, they should have had their bill so amended as to have
embraced them, and thereby enabled the opposite party to gainsay
them if he could:—therefore the account of the plaintiffs with
John Rogers alone, and also their claim for costs in the suit against
Penelope D. Price, must both be rejected, (m)

The claim of the solicitors, Murray and Rogers, which appears
to have been partially sanctioned by the order of the 9th of January,
1824, may be considered as somewhat in the nature of costs; and
it having been placed by the auditor's report before the party's
other counsel, and all concerned, and no objection having been
made, it would seem now to be proper to allow it entire; and it
may be so stated by the auditor.

There is no evidence, derivable from any competent source, going
to show, that the complainants ever received the money said to be
due on the bonds of a Doctor Harsnip, which were said to have been
in their hands and others:—any discount or deduction from the
claim of the complainants, on that account, must therefore be
rejected by the auditor.

According to the established usage and practice of the court, as
has been explained, there are but two modes by which other cre-
ditors can be permitted to come in and participate, in cases of this
sort; they are either by petition, or by filing the vouchers of their

(m) Spragg 9. Birkes, 5 Ves. 580; 5 Bac. Abr. 668; Purefoy v. Purefoy, 1 Vern.
201 Hutson v. Lowry & Neville, 2 Virg. Cases, 42; 1825, ch, 167; Wallis v. Saville,

2 Lutw. 1536.

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