THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE. 661

selves prove, present to the minds of the legislature during the
passage of each one of them.

The General Assembly of 1785, distinctly inform us, in every
way, by their messages, by the acts which they proposed to pass,
and by the act which they actually did pass into a law, that they
could only fix the amount of the chancellor's salary; that when
they had so fixed it, that amount was secured by operation of the
Declaration of Rights; but, that the appropriation might be made
in such manner as they thought proper; and, accordingly, they
expressly declared, that their general appropriation should remain
only until they " make oilier provision for payment" The evidences
as to the opinions of the General Assembly of 1792, are not so
various and large; but, they are no less distinctly expressed in
the act which they passed upon the subject. Their act recites,
that the salary which they gave was secured by the constitution ;
and, then it asserts and exercises a discretionary power over the
appropriation, by setting apart a particular fund, and limiting its
continuance to five years, and no longer.

There is sufficiently unequivocal evidence, that the same dis-
tinct ideas were present to the minds of the General Assembly
of 1798; and, that they too acted under the influenee of the same
opinions. Their act upon this subject is entitled, " A supplement
to the act, entitled an act for establishing and securing the salary
of the chancellor." Thus expressly referring to that Jaw, in which
all those ideas and distinctions, and all that train of thinking upon
this subject, which had been so thoroughly discussed and consid-
ered, at the session of 1785, and reconsidered, and reaffirmed at the
session of 1792, were strongly and clearly recalled, and placed
before the minds of the legislators of 1798.

And why was this done ? Why was the act of 1798 called
"A supplement" to that of 1792? Why were the previous legis-
lative acts thus referred to ? Surely, it could not have been done
for the purpose of bringing before the eyes of the legislators of
1798, an example of the prostration of any of the securities of
good government. It certainly could not have been done, for the
purpose of reading them a lesson, as to the mode, and the pretexts,
and the expedients under which the constitution might be evaded
or violated. It could not have been intended to read the most
solemn recognitions of constitutional principles for the purpose of
obliterating or smothering them. It would be monstrous 10 sup-
pose, that any legislators would invoke, and place upon