660 THE CHANCELLORS CASE.

the chancellor." And it is enacted, " that the chancellor shaD be
entitled to receive, for all duties and services whatever prescribed
or to be prescribed by law, an annual salary of twelve hundred and
seventy-five pounds current money, and no more, to be paid quar-
terly by the treasurer of the Western Shore." And then imme-
diately follows the second section limiting the duration of the act
in these words; " This act to continue and be in force till the
twentieth day of October, eighteen hundred, and until the next
session of Assembly which shall happen thereafter."

The limitation of this act operates so far, and so far only, as it
is compatible with the Declaration of Rights. In so much as it
contravenes the constitution, it is a nullity; but, in other respects,
it may be allowed to operatejaccording to the express or implied
intention of the legislature. This act specifies the amount of the
chancellor's salary; and, that amount, not by the act, but by the
Declaration of Rights, is secured to the chancellor during the con-
tinuance of his commission. So far, then, the constitution expressly
cuts off and prevents the operation of the limitation of the second
section. But, upon other matters, this limitation may have its full
effect. Upon the general appropriation, or authority to pay that
amount out of any money in the treasury of the Western Shore, it
may and does operate; because, as to the fund to be appropriated,
and as to the mode of making provision for payment, the legislature
has a discretionary power; and, as to that, they may make an express
reservation of the right to appropriate at pleasure, as was done by
the act of 1785; or, they may make a special, and, also a limited
appropriation, as was done by the act of 1792. Because, as we
have geen, the amount, and duration of the salary being wholly dis-
tinct from the appropriation, or " the provision for payment," as it
is called by the act of 1785, the two first are secured, during the
period specified by the constitutio n; and the other is at the plea-
sure of the legislature.

The three acts of 1785, of 1792, and of 1798, are, then, all of
them in their objects, intentions, and principles precisely alike, in
every particular. They, each of them, bestow upon the chancel-
lor a specified amount of salary; which was, in each instance, by
operation of the Declaration of Rights, secured to the chancellor
during the continuance of his commission; and, in each instance, the
legislature reserved, or expressly exercised a discretionary power over
the appropriation) or " provision for payment." And these distinct
ideas, in this train of thinking, were obviously, as the acts them-