662 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.

tables, the clearest evidences of the chancellor's constitutional
independency, for the express purpose of prostrating it; and of
making him the mere simple creature of either branch of the Assem-
bly; and that too, not by a bold and open movement, which struck
down his rights at a single blow; but, by the low and crawling
contrivance of a temporary act; which, while it offered an osten-
sible extension of bounty, covertly and in reality bought out the
chancellor's independency', the chief stay, the pride, and the only
blessing of his high and laborious station. No such designs can,
or ought to be imputed to the legislators of 1798.

On the contrary, those legislators could have had no other inten-
tion, in thus announcing their act as " A supplement " to that of
1792, than to assert, by the very first word they recorded upon the
statute book, that they followed the example, and legislated under
the same impressions, and according to the same principles, that
their predecessors had done. They meant to say, that, they adopted
the principles of the act of 1792; that as that act conformed to the
Declaration of Rights, in giving to the chancellor a salary during
the continuance of his commission; so this, their act, should give
him a salary for a similar duration. That as the act of 1792 had
made only a temporary provision for the payment of the amount
then given; so this, their act, should, in like manner, temporarily
provide for the payment of that they gave. The act of 1792 gave
the less, this the greater amount; the act of 1792 set apart a par-
ticular fund for payment; this act, in general terms, directs, that
the amount given shall be " paid by the treasurer of the Western
Shore." These are the points of similarity and of difference
between these two acts. The latter is, then, in sense and sub-
stance, honestly and fairly "A supplement" to the former. It fol-
lows, therefore, that the present chancellor is now, and will be
entitled, during the continuance of his commission, to demand and
receive, annually, by virtue of this act of 1798, and of the thirtieth
article of the Declaration of Rights, the sum of twelve hundred
and seventy-five pounds current money.

These three distinct ideas of the amount, the duration, and the
provision for payment of judicial salaries have been continually,
under all circumstances, and on every change, carefully borne in
mind by the representatives of the people of Maryland. After the
alteration of the judicial system of this State, made by the act of

1804. ch. 55, was confirmed, the legislature passed the act of

1805. ch. 86, entitled " An act to establish permanent salaries for