346 CHASE v. MANHARDT.

Court of this State, it has been strongly urged sustains the posi-
tion, that an attachment does not of itself in all cases stop the
accumulation of interest during its pendency. On the other hand,
it is contended, that this case as reported is obscure, contradictory,
absurd, and cannot be law. Let us examine it.

The case is this.—Rutland, in October 1786, obtained a judg-
ment against West, which " was to be released on payment of
£849 9s. 8d. with interest from the 31st of October 1786 till paid,
and costs. Mason having obtained a judgment against Rutland,
for ,£3234; on the 4th of August 1786, issued an attachment on
his judgment which he laid in the hands of West on the said debt
so by him due to Rutland; and on the second Tuesday of Octo-
ber 1788, Mason obtained a condemnation in the hands of West,
of no more than the principal and costs mentioned in Rutland's
judgment, leaving the interest thereon, from the 31st of October
1786 to the day of the condemnation, untouched. Upon this state
of things the only question was whether Rutland could recover the
whole interest during that time; a part of which had accrued pend-
ing the attachment. Upon which the court gave judgment for the
plaintiff.

Now it is said here is an apparent absurdity;—because Mason's
claim was large enough to cover the whole of .Rutland's judgment
including principal, interest, and costs; and yet Mason had only
the principal and costs condemned, leaving the interest; that such
a partial condemnation could not have been, because the law would
not allow it. But there may be an attachment for part of a debt,
which may be pleaded in bar pro tanto.(s) Why Mason attached
only a part of this debt due upon Rutlandjs judgment does not
appear; but he might, and it appears did do so, and obtained a
condemnation for the principal and costs only. And, consequently,
the court appears to have correctly decided, that the attachment
was a bar only pro tanto, to the amount covered by the condem-
nation, and no more.

It has been also urged, that after the recovery or payment of the
principal, a creditor cannot, sue for and recover the interest. But
if a credit or" receives or recovers his principal debt in any manner
so as not thereby either expressly or tacitly to relinquish his claim
to the interest then due, he may as rightfully sue for and recover
the interest then due, as if it were so much of the principal debt

(s) Com. Dig. tit Attachment, G. & H.