CHASE v. MANHARDT.

he should be held answeraole for the delay, and be charged with
interests and costs..

In this case Chase pleaded, or suffered to be pleaded nul tiel
record, and nulla dona. He thus opposed the plaintiff's right to
recover as principal and as ally in the controversy. He assumed
the hostile attitude and position of a litigating debtor in every point
of view. He comes now, therefore, with an ill grace into a court
of equity to ask to be exempted from bearing the burthen of that
loss which was the necessary and inevitable consequence of the
position he had assumed. This same creditor had, just previously,
to obtain satisfaction of this same debt, made a similar demand by
attachment upon John H. Barney, who brought his debt into court
and was thereupon dismissed without costs. Chase should have
profited by the example.

But, it is said, that the attachment placed Chase in the condition
of a mere stake-holder; and that a stake-holder is never charged
with interest. Such, however, is not the case here, in point of
fact. These parties have not consented, that Chase should stand
here between them, and keep this money as a mere stake-holder;
nor has the attaching creditor forced him to assume and continue
in that position. Because, the court of justice, before which he
was cited, was open and ready to relieve him from that situation,
whenever he thought proper to ask its protection. If without
having had the money attached in his hands, it had been demanded
of him by two or more persons, each t»f whom claimed a right
thereto in opposition to the other, he might have filed his bill of
interpleader, and been relieved from the risk of paying it to either.
But he could only ask for such relief on bringing the money into
court; for equity will in no case even listen to any such cause of
complaint, so long as the party holds the money in his own hands.(g.)

Upon the whole then, it appears, that the rule laid down by the
highest judicial authority of Pennsylvania upon this subject, is
founded upon principles which have no existence in this State;
and that the reasons of it are at variance with many of the well
established principles of our law. Consequently, however just
and beneficial the rule may be there, it cannot be considered as
deserving the least regard in this State.

The case of Quynn v. Wester) decided by the late General

(q)1-Mad. Chan.174; Spring v. S.C. Ins. Company, 8 Wheat 268.—(r) 3 H. &
McH. 124.

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