CHASE v. MANHARDT.

itself which he had suffered to remain in his debtor's hands; for
there is no more reason why the interest should not be recovered
after the debt had been paid in a manner not to imply an abandon-
ment of the interest; than that a party should not recover the
mesne profits of land after he had obtained possession by means
of an action of ejectment, (t)

Upon the whole then, although it may be admitted, that this
case of Quynn v. West has not been so fully and perspicuously
reported as it might have been; yet there is no just ground to
charge it with absurdity, or to impeach the correctness of its prin-
ciples in any way. By this decision it does most clearly appear to
have been held, that Mason's attachment did not prevent the accu-
mulation of interest upon Rutland's judgment during its pendency.
There are no reasons given for this or any other of the positions,
which are necessarily involved in the judgment the court pro-
nounced.

But as to the reason and propriety of a debt's carrying interest
during the pendency of an attachment, I entirely concur with what
has been said by the Court of Appeals of Virginia. "In all such
cases," it is said, "the safe and sound doctrine is, that if the
party, though restrained from paying, holds and uses the money,
(and we must presume he uses, if he continues to hold it,) he
ought to pay interest; because the owner of the debt has a right to
the interest; because money is worth its interest; and if the holder
does not think so, he has always the privilege of bringing the
money into court; and because, if the debtor could under this
restraining process, hold the debt for years, without interest, it
would offer a strong temptation to him, to stir up claims of this
kind, and to throw all possible obstacles in the way of a decision
of the questions raised, "(u)

I am, therefore, satisfied as well by reason and analogy, as by
direct- authority, that an attachment has not the effect and operation
of suspending any claim for interest, which exists independently of
that judicial proceeding; and, consequently, that in this case Chase
is properly chargeable with interest by virtue of his contract.

It has been urged, that Manhardt obtained a judgment against
Bryden for more than he was entitled to. The court has not been

(O Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Ves. jun. 162; Snowden v. Thomas, 4 H. & J. 337; Dixon
v. Parkes, 1 Esp. Rep. 110; Tillotson v. Preston, 3 John. Rep. 229; Johnston v.
Brannan, 5 John. Rep. 268.—(u) Templeman v. FaunUeroy, 3 Rand. 447; Taztwell
v. Barrett, 4 Hen. & Mun. 259; Hunter v. Spotswood, 1 Wash. 145.