344 CHASE v. MANHARDT.

interest on the ground of his neglect. But if, being sued, he con
tests the claim, then he is chargeable on the stronger ground of his
wilful opposition and denial of justice.

It is difficult to conceive what pretension a garnishee can have
to stand in a better-predicament than a defendant debtor. He is
cited as a debtor; and is called into court certainly in that charac-
ter, although not by that name and in that form. It is often said,
that the object of our U attachment acts and practice," is to enforce
an appearance. It ma j with as much propriety be said, that their
intention is to compel a ptea or any entry upon the docket. Their
true and only object is to enable a creditor to obtain satisfaction
out of any property found in this State belonging to his absent or
absconding debtor; and for that purpose they have provided " a
special auxiliary remedy for the recovery of debts :"(m) some-
thing analogous to which will be found to exist in every rode
whatever.(n) Hence it is evident, upon general principles, that
a garnishee stands in all respects in a situation exactly similar to
that of a defendant debtor; having the same rights and subject to
the same liabilities. He may have leave, at any time, to bring the
debt into court; and he is chargeable with interest from the time it
becomes due until it is paid.

The positive provisions of our attachment act,(o) looks to and
evidently sanctions this right or duty of the garnishee to bring the
sum attached into court for the purpose of relieving himself from
further responsibility and trouble. He may contest the claim made
against him; but, if he does so, the act declares he shall be liable
to costs ;—whence it clearly follows, that by assuming the position
of a litigating debtor he would, as in all other similar cases, be
also chargeable with interest upon the debt. A garnishee may not
only defend his own interests, as a mere neutral in the controversy
between the plaintiff and defendant; but he may also assume upon
himself the character of an ally of the defendant. He is allowed
to plead and defend his rights for him, and in his behalf.(p) But
if he thus con tests .the plaintiff's right to recover either as principal
or ally in the controversy, the genius of our law, as well as the
reason and justice of the case seem most strongly to require, that

(m) Burk v. McClain, 1 H. & McH. 286; Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535;
Davidson's Lessee v. Beatty, 3 H. & McH. 594; Shivers v. Wilson, 5 H. & J. 130.
(ti) Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2540; Manro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473; 2 Bro. Civil
Law,333.—(o) 1715, ch. 40, s. 4.—~(p) 1795, ch. 56, s. 4; Wilson v Starr,1 H. St
J.491.