CHASE v. MANHARDT. 343

bearance of money. Therefore, where a person is prevented by
law, as in that instance, during the revolutionary war, from paying
the principal, he shall not be compelled to pay interest during the
continuance of the prohibition. And upon this analogy and these
reasons, it is said, that the garnishee shall not be compelled
to pay interest pending the attachment ;(h)—unless he has been
guilty of fraud or collusion, or has himself occasioned some
unreasonable delay; which is in no case to be presumed, but must
be proved.(i)

Nothing can appear to be more just and equitable than, that
when a debtor is positively prohibited from paying his creditor, or
is prevented from doing so by the overruling calamity of war, he
ought not to pay interest. Because in such case he is compelled
against his will to become the holder or bailee of the money, at his
own risk; and that too perhaps at a time and under circumstances*
when it may be very unsafe to use it, or utterly impossible to
derive any benefit from the use of it. So far the reason is satis-
factory, and applies as forcibly here as any where else.( j)

But in this State a garnishee, in an attachment case, is not thus
absolutely tied up and restricted. He is not bound to hold the
money at his own risk and against his consent, or longer than he
chooses.(/c) Now it is upon this very principle, of the existence
of such a positive restriction, that the rule of the Pennsylvania
law is based. It is, that the restriction imposed by attachment
is altogether analogous to that prohibition imposed by a posi-
tive law, or a public war. This may be so there, but here it is
otherwise.

I take it to be the established law of this State, that the defend-
ant, in all actions founded on contract for the recovery of a debt,
may have leave as a matter of course to bring the sum sued for
into court; and thus put a stop to the further accumulation of
interest and costs, at least for so much as he brings in.(l) In those
cases where the debt carries interest according to law, the mere
bringing of an action for the recovery of it does not suspend the
accumulation of interest for a single moment. Because it is the
duty of the debtor to seek his creditor and make payment; and if
he fails to do so he is liable to be sued, and is chargeable with

(A) Hoare v. Alien, 2 Ball. 102.—(i) Fitzgerald v. Caldwell, 2 Dal. 215.—( j) Du-
lany v. Wells, 3 H. & McH. 23; Court v. Vanbibber, 3 H. & McH. 144; Bordley v.
Eden, 3 H. & McH. 167.—(&) Ross v. Austin, 4 Hen. & Mun. 502.—{l) Tidd
Prac. 561.