220 HANNAH K. CHASE'S CASE.

the first case, and every thing relative to it, may be wholly laid
aside.

Looking at this agreement, in relation to the dower cases alone,
it seems to be wholly gratuitous, without any valuable consideration
whatever moving from either party. The plaintiff was to recover
nothing to which she could not produce a clear subsisting title. She
was to be endowed of certain specified property, provided she satisfied
the court, that she was entitled to dower therein. It is neither said
nor insinuated, that she was to be endowed of any one parcel of
land, in consideration of her relinquishing dower in any other
parcel. In short, she was to be endowed of no land in which she
was not legally entitled to dower; and to no greater amount than
its exact value, to be determined by the court. The plaintiff agreed
to dismiss her bills claiming dower, as to all the property not included
in the agreement, and to pay all costs. This concluding branch of
the agreement is perfectly in character with every other part of it.
Like the rest, it is merely gratuitous; and, consequently, according
to every principle of equity, it cannot be construed into a release
of any right, beyond the express and irresistible sense of the terms
used.

The words of the agreement are, that "the bills be dismissed."
Suppose this agreement had been followed out by a formal decree,
then the court must have dealt with the matter in the manner in
which it was submitted; that is, it must have determined upon the
rights of the parties as to all the property specified in the agree-
ment; and as to the residue, it could only have ordered, in pursu-
ance of the agreement, "that the bills be dismissed with costs."(i)
To make a decree a good and available bar, in any subsequent suit,
it is not sufficient merely to shew, that the bill was dismissed; but
the party must go further, and shew, that the matter of the blll was
res judicata; that there was an absolute determination by the court,
that the party had no tide.(j) But the Chancellor could not, in
those cases, have given any determination in relation to the plain-
tiff's title to dower in the Fountain Inn; because he was deprived
of the means of doing so by the agreement, which simply directed,
that those suits as to that property should be dismissed with costs.
No decree which the Chancellor could have pronounced in pursu-
ance of that agreement, could have given to it any additional extent

(i) Rowe v. Wood, 1 Jac. & Walk. 345.—(j) Brandlyn v. Ord, 1 Atk. 571; Mitf
Tr. 238; 3 Mad. Cha. 312; Beam. PL Eq. 218.