HANNAH K. CHASED CASE. 221

Of force as a bar against the present plaintiff. There was, however,
no formal decree ever passed in those cases; they were closed on
the 19th of July, 1819, by the short docket entry "agreed," evidently
in reference to this written agreement.

The question, therefore, recurs upon the agreement aldfae. It is
stipulated, that the bills be dismissed as to the property not included
in the agreement. It is a contract to abandon those suits; but it
is not a relinquishment of the right claimed by them. The two
things are substantially different; and that difference, it appears
from the whole phraseology of the agreement, was in the then
contemplation of the parties. Much is directed to be done, to
facilitate the speedy progress of the suit; the usual formal and
tedious mode of collecting testimony, necessary to a correct decision
upon the rights of the parties, is dispensed with; and the suits
are to be brought to a close in a summary way; but no right is
ceded, no title is relinquished by either party. On the contrary,
we are told, that the plaintiff is to recover; provided, and only
provided the Chancellor shall so determine. The defendants
concede to the plaintiff nothing, absolutely nothing. They, there-
fore, can have no equitable ground to claim from her an abandon-
ment of her rights. The agreement, that the bills be dismissed
must be considered as referring to a mere voluntary dismissal by
the plaintiff herself, which would leave her rights and interests
untouched and unimpaired in all respects whatever.

This agreement is not so explicit as it might, and perhaps ought
to have been; but, after mature consideration, I find enough in it
to bring my mind satisfactorily to the conclusion, that it cannot be
deemed a relinquishment of the plaintiff's right of dower in the
Fountain Inn. The solicitors on both sides have contended, that
it is entirely unambiguous; and yet they have had recourse to the
proofs and circumstances to aid the interpretation respectively con-
tended for. A few remarks upon those circumstances and proofs
seem therefore to be required.

To the lease from the late husband of the plaintiff to Bryden,
of the Fountain Inn, she made a formal relinquishment of dower.
This lease did not expire until the 26th of February, 1821, some
years after the commencement of the two former dower suite.
'this was an embarrassing circumstance. These defendants admit
it to have been so considered at that time; for they say, in their
answer, that, as they have been advised, the plaintiff's acknow-
ledgment of the lease to Bryden did not operate as a bar of her