HANNAH K. CHASE'S CASE.

but the letter of Stephen and" Magruder, dated on the 28th of Sep-
tember, 1816, speaks of propositions for compromising these suits
as then depending. And the Chancellor remarks, at the foot of his
decree in the first cause, dated the 17th of July 1817, that" it is
passed as being considered within the meaning of the agreement
signed by the parties." Consequently, this agreeement S. M. must
have been executed some time between those dates.

By the agreement S. M., a decree was to be passed in the first
case in favour of the plaintiff for the amount demanded, with costs;
which was done accordingly on the 17th of July, 1817. As to the
second and third, or the dower cases, as they may be called, the
instrument of writing declares, that "It is also further agreed, that
in the two last of the above causes, decrees shall pass giving the
complainant dower in the following tracts, pieces or parcels of land,
to wit,"—going on to specify certain property, without the least
allusion to the Fountain Inn; and then proceeds in these words:
"Provided, it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Chancellor, by
the* exhibition of title papers or otherwise, as he may order, that
the said Hannah K. Chase hath a right to dower in the same. And
it is further agreed, that a compensation in money shall be paid to
the complainant by the defendants, for and in lieu of her dower in
the property abovementioned, and that such compensation shall be
fixed by the Chancellor, upon evidence offered to him of the value
of the said respective pieces or parcels of land, by the actual sales,
where sales are to be made by the trustees as aforesaid, and for
want of sales, by depositions shewing such value; to be taken
before some justice of the peace for Baltimore county, residing in
the city of Baltimore, by either party, upon giving three days' notice.
And it is further agreed, that the said bills be dismissed as to all
the property in the proceedings mentioned, not specified and
included in this agreement. And that the complainant pay the
costs."

The motives, which induced the parties to enter into this agree-
ment, are not expressed in the instrument itself? nor can they be
clearly inferred from any thing that is said in it. The first suit,
instituted by Hannah K. Chase and John P. Paca, seems to have
no sort of connexion with the subsequent dower cases. According
to the agreement, the plaintiffs, in that case, were to have a decree
for all they asked; and then it proceeds to speak of the dower
cases, without making any allusion whatever to that case. There-
fore, while confining our contemplation to the agreement alone,