HEPBURN'S CASE,—3 BLAND. 83

into the principles upon which the award was founded, and upon
consideration of all circumstances to decree as equity and justice
might require. Resolution, 24th 3fay, 1787. Upon which the Chan-
cellor declared, that he considered it to be the meaning of the
General Assembly to place him in the room of the arbitrators,
whose powers were defective, and to enlarge the submission so
that complete justice might be done. And therefore he held, that
it would not be consistent with his duty to consider the case in the
same light as if the contest were between two individuals coming
before him for decision according to the principles established by
preceding determinations in Chancery; and he proceeded to dis-
pose of the case accordingly as an arbitrator would have done.
Garretson v. The Attorney-General, 18th August, 1790, Chancery
Proceedings, lib. D, fol. 385.

In that instance the State not only admitted the facts in favor
of an individual, but also waived all the strict rules of law and
equity of which it might have taken advantage; and liberally di-
rected the case to be submitted to arbitration unembarrassed by
any forms or rules whatever. The resolution under consideration
involving a claim upon property in the hands of the State, although
peculiar and special in its nature, must be regarded as a public law
of which the Courts are bound to take notice. There are, however,
many instances in which the Legislature has, by private Acts, in-
terposed, without prejudice to any private rights, to remove diffi-
culties and give facilities in the disposition of property in which
the State had no interest; by providing modes of leasing, mort-
gaging or selling legal or equitable estates of deceased persons for
the payment of their debts, or to save the more profitable per-
sonalty; *or so that the property might be made produc-100
tive for the relief of the necessities of those interested; or
to enable infants to convey in pursuance of a will under which
they took as devisees. Under such laws the Chancellor proceeds
according to the mode prescribed, pursuing the ordinary course of
proceeding in aid of such private Acts, and only so far as they are
silent as to the mode of proceeding and the powers conferred by
them may be so executed, and are constitutional. Cambells, 2
Bland, 230; Williams' Case, post; Hughes' Case, 1 Bland, 46; Igle-
hart v. Armiger, 1 Bland, 520.

Here it is perfectly manifest, that the resolution by which this
case has been referred to the Chancellor, makes no assumption of
facts; nor admits any; nor, on behalf of the State, waives the
benefit of the well established principles of law or equity properly
applicable to the merits of the case; but on the contrary it calls
upon the State's chief law officer to attend and defend its rights
and interests. 3 Blac. Com. 250; Mitf. Plea. 31. The case was
presented to the General Assembly by petition, accompanied by
sundry vouchers and documents; and, in that form, it has been