82 HEPBURN'S CASE.—3 BLAND.

may take the property of any individual and cause it to be applied
to the use of the public, on making him a reasonable compensation.
But it cannot arbitrarily take property from one citizen and bestow
it upon another; because such an act, although not specially pro-
hibited by the Constitution, would be contrary to the fundamen-
tal principles of the Government itself. The Federalist, No. 44;
Trustees of the University v. Foy, 2 Hayw. 310, 374; Dash v. Van
Kleeck, 7 John. 477. If such a transfer of property could not be
openly and directly made, it certainly could not be done covertly
or circuitously; and therefore, in any reference of a case to the
judiciary, as in this instance, the Legislature could not command
a Court of justice to stay, or depart from its regular course of pro-
ceeding in a particular case; 1827, ch. 141; or arbitrarily to assume
any fact, not admitted by the party, which would give rise to a
legal or equitable principle destructive of the interests of credi-
tors, or of the right of property of such party; because it would
be, in effect, and indirectly, to transfer such property from one
person to another. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peter, 380. Even
during the Provincial Government, when the General Assembly
of the Province was held to be endowed with a sovereign and un-
limited power, similar to that claimed by the Parliament of Eng-
land, such an assumption of facts and consequent transfer of prop-
erty, was considered as so dangerous and unjust an act as to call
forth a solemn protest from one of the most profound lawyers of
his time. Partridge v. Dorsey, 3 R. & J. 307, note. Therefore,
where the facts have been assumed by the Legislature in the refer-
ence of the case to the Chancellor, although he may act upon them,
as has been done in some instances, if they should be admitted by
the party, or there should be no opposition; yet, without such con-
sent, it might be difficult for him to acquiesce under such an
assumption where the rights of a party were materially affected
by it. May v. May, Buller N. P. 112; Campbell's Case, 2 Bland, 230.

But as the General Assembly must be allowed to have a large
discretionary power over public property and money in the trea-
sury; *I should without difficulty yield to any assumption
99 of facts, affecting the rights of the State only, in favor of
an individual. And upon the same principles the State may, for
itself, waive the benefit of any rules of law or equity which ope-
rate in its favor.

As where in a suit instituted in Chancery on a controversy which
arose between the intendant and a purchaser of confiscated prop-
erty, the case was, by a resolution of the General Assembly, di-
rected to be referred to arbitration; Resolution, 1784, No. 4; and
the arbitrators having made an award in which they stated, that
their powers, under the resolution, were not sufficiently extensive
to enable them to do complete justice, the case was, by another
resolution referred to the Chancellor with directions to enquire