CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.—3 BLAND. 645

But as a suit may be brought against one who absconds or who
is not an inhabitant of Maryland, in any County Court of the State,
it may be inconvenient to ascertain the existence of a judicial lien
upon any lands held by him in this State; it is, however, an incon-
venience arising out of the peculiar nature of things, and could not
be avoided without very injuriously trenching upon the rule which
has established the generality of such liens. These remarks may
be applied with the same force to an executor or administrator,
supposing him to be bound, as in England, to take notice, at his
peril, of all judgments and decrees against his testator or intes-
tate. Searle v. Lane, 2 Vern. 88; Nimmo v. The Common-
wealth. 4 Hen. & Mun. 57. *But our law, although it directs 670
judgments and decrees to be first paid, expressly protects execu-
tors and administrators who proceed as the law directs, as well
from the claims of judgment creditors, as of all others of which
they had no notice. 1798, ch. 101. sub-ch. 8, s. 15, 17; 1802, ch.
101, s. 8.

From all that has been said, it is therefore clear, that these
judgments obtained by Robert Oliver and by others, to the use of
Charles Carroll, in Baltimore County Court, gave them a lien in
virtue thereof upon all the real estate of the Cape Sable Company
lying in Anne Arundel or any other county of the State.

The Act of Assembly by which these defendants the Cape Sable
Company, were incorporated, declares, "that the lands, tenements,
stock, property, and estate of the Cape Sable Company, is and
shall be held as real estate, and shall descend as such agreeably to
the Acts of Assembly in such cases made and provided, when not
otherwise disposed of." 1818, ch. 195, s. 8. And the trustees who
made the sale of their estate under the decree in this case, in their
report described it as consisting of lands, of slaves, of horses, of
the implements of the manufactory, &c.; that is, of real estate
technically and properly so called, and of mere perishable per-
sonalty.

It. would seem to be perfectly clear, according to the first branch
of this section of the Act of incorporation, that this mere perish-
able personalty is as much a part of that stock, property, and estate
of the Cape Sable Company, which it is declared shall be held as
real estate, as their lands and tenements; and that it must be so
treated as far as practicable, whatever inconveniences may ensue.
But it is added, that the estate shall descend as such when not
otherwise disposed of; thereby indicating it to have been the in-
tention of the Act, that it should be so held as regarded the inte-
rests of the stockholders themselves; and as real estate to descend
accordingly from them; not that the actual legal character of the
perishable moveables should be changed as well in regard to the
rights and interests of all other persons as the stockholders them-
selves. Binney's Case, 2 Bland, 146.