644 CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.—3 BLAND.

When these laws, enlarging the operation of judgments ren-
dered in the County Courts, were passed, the General Court was in
existence, the power of which, as a Court of original jurisdictiou,
extended over the whole State; and from which, as setting on the
Western or Eastern Shore, an execution might be sent, upon its
judgments, to any one of the counties of the State, against the
property of the defendant. The Court of Chancery also, being
then, as it is now, and always has been, a Court having original
jurisdiction over the whole State, having been authorized to en-
force its decrees by a fieri facias, directed to any county of the
State, against the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of the
defendant; 1785, ch. 72. s. 25: thereby had its decrees likewise
made a lien upon the defendant's lands every where, to the same
extent as a judgment of the General Court. Coombs v. Jordan,
ante, 284. And the Court of Appeals having been authorized to
pronounce such a judgment as the inferior Court of common law
might have done, and to issue execution thereon to any
669 * county of the State, returnable formerly to the General
Court; 1800, ch. 69: and now before itself; 1810, ch. 156; were all
alike liens upon the real estate of the defendant every where.
Whence it appears, that these last mentioned Acts of Assembly:
1794, ch. 54; 1795, ch. 23: did no more, in effect, than to har-
monize our Code by giving to all judgments and decrees, whether
of the County Court, the General Court, the Court of Chancery,
or the Court of Appeals, the same efficacy against the real estate
of the defendant in whatever county of the State it might be
found; and consequently gave a lien which fastened upon it from
the date of such judgment or decree.

If it were at all necessary or expedient to give to the judgments
of all the Courts of the State the same pervading efficacy, during
the existence of the General Court, when there was a Court of
common law whose jurisdiction extended over the whole State, and
in which a judgment with such a wide spread hen, might have
been obtained, it certainly is much more so now, since that Court
has been abolished; and particularly as the affirmance of a County
Court judgment placets it in the power of the party to obtain exe-
cution from the Court of Appeals, and thus to give to his judicial
lien an effect co-extensive with the range of the process of that
Court. And when it is recollected, that no inhabitant can be
arrested or sued in any other county than that in which he resides,
it will be seen, that this general operation of the lieu, arising from
the judgment of a County Court, can be attended with little or no
inconvenience or hardship to a purchaser, or to any one else;
because such a judicial lien can only originate, and therefore must

necessarily be found of record in the County Court of the county
in which the defendant resided at the time of the institution of
the suit. •