594 CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.—3 BLAND.

province to say they were correct, or that they erred. The case
under consideration is not of that character. An authority to
appear * to a suit against a corporation can only be com-
613 municated, by the corporate seal, is a proposition not to be
controverted. The authority under which the appearance is en-
tered need not be made a part of the record to sustain the judg-
ment. In favor of the judgment, the Court will presume the
authority to appear was complete. These principles are recog-
nized by the Court of Appeals in the case of McMechen v. The
Mayor, &e. of Baltimore, 2 H. & G. 41. But the Court cannot
presume against the fact; and, if the authority given did not jus-
tify the appearance and judgment, the judgment cannot be sus-
tained. If the process of the Court of law to enforce the pay-
ment of such a judgment, cannot be restrained by this tribunal,
the party is remediless. For, if the property taken in virtue of
an execution founded on such a judgment is sold; except it was
purchased by the plaintiff in the cause, the right of the defend-
ant to the property is gone by the sale, notwithstanding the judg-
ment should be reversed.

There are two objections to the judgment under consideration,
each of which appear fatal. First, the authority under which the
appearance was entered does appear, and the corporate seal is not
annexed. Second, Richard Caton describes himself, not as the
president of the Cape Sable Company, the corporate name, but
as "Pres'd't of the A. and Copp's Co. of Cape Sable,'' a name,
not only in words, but in substance, essentially different. By the
Act of incorporation, the company, with the consent of three-
tourths of the stockholders holding three-fourths of the shares,
may engage in other manufactures besides alum and copperas.

To recur again to the merits of the case. The money, the
answers allege, was loaned in consequence of Caton's pledging, or
agreeing to pledge the funds. The answers state he was duly
authorized. But how he was authorized; in what manner the au-

thority was given, is not communicated.

But. it has been contended in the argument on behalf of the
defendants, that as it is stated by the answer, that Caton was au-
thorized, that that is sufficient. If, as it was said, it was neces-
sary for three-fourths of the stockholders holding three-fourths of
the shares to communicate the authority, then, as he could not have
been authorized without such consent, their consent was given;
therefore, the answer, in effect, declares such consent was ob-
tained. If the authority could be given, with the consent of less
than * three-fourths, then, in stating the authority was
614 given, the answer, in substance, does not undertake to al-
lege, that the consent of the three-fourths was obtained. That is,
in other words, the defendants would not, or could not state how
the authority was given.