CAPE SABLE COMPANY'S CASE.—3 BLAND. 593

The agent was duly authorized, and acting in the ordinary course
of his business. How different are these causes from the one now
under consideration!

At the time when the judgment in this case was entered the bill
alleges, that the manufactories were carried on by the company
yielding such great profits, that the debt of Robert and John
Oliver, supposing it to be really due, must have been satisfied be-
fore the time would have arrived for rendering judgment in the
regular * course of law. To this allegation in the bill no
answer is given by the defendants; their answer is silent on 612
the subject. In the answer of the defendants it is stated, that on
the 20th of February, 1822, seventeen thousand dollars were due on
account of loans to the company at different periods. When the
loans commenced, and the amount of each, as well as the time of
each advance, is not disclosed, either by the answer, or by any
other part of the transaction. At the time when they begun the
situation of the company was so deplorable, that but tor them,
the answer alleges, au entire stop must have been put to the pro-
ceedings, to the great loss and injury of all concerned. Yet take
the answer and bill together, when the situation of the company
was so flourishing as to enable it. in the short space of time a suit
would have occupied, to discharge a debt of $17,000, au immediate
and instantaneous determination is to put a stop to the works; at
least so far as the interests of the complainants in them extended.

Admitting the facts to be as set forth in the answer, that the
stockholders, at a time of embarrassment and difficulty, author-
ized Caton to borrow money to carry on the works; can it follow,
from that authority, that he had aright to such an extent to bring
on ruin and destruction? In obtaining those loans, was Richard
Caton acting, to use the language of the Supreme Court of the
United States, within the scope of the legitimate purposes of the
institution? If he was, then the parol contract made by him must
amount to au express promise of the corporation, and lay a foun-
dation for an action. But although he was the agent, if he went
beyond the scope of his authority, although a loss may be sus-
tained by those who confided in him, his engagements are not,
either express or implied promises on the part of the corporation,
and they present no foundation for maintaining an action. But,
it is not my province to decide the question of law, whether the
plaintiffs could have obtained judgment at law, if the claim had
been resisted, and the attention of the Court called to the subject,
I, therefore, proceed to the second question.

Is the authority given such as to justify the entering of the
judgment?

In examining this point, I have to disclaim all authority to in-
terfere with the judgments of a .Court of law; except on equit-
able principles; where the Court directs a judgment, it is not my
38 3B.