WILLIAMS' CASE.—3 BLAND. 265

remainderman; yet as between landlord and a tenant rendering
rent; and as between a tenant of a house rendering rent to a land-
lord, who himself pays rent over to a ground landlord for the same
estate, the question is different; and the mode of adjusting the
burthen of taxation, in such cases, is by no means so clear. The
proportions and the mode in which a ta.x should be borne by those
who hold distinct interests in the same land seems to have been
attended with some perplexity every where; and it appears, that
the matter remained long in doubt here, even if it can yet be con-
sidered as having been finally put to rest.

It has been laid down as a settled principle, that the citizens of
every State ought to contribute towards the support of the govern-
ment, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abili-
ties; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively
enjoy under the protection of the State. The expense of govern-
ment to the individuals of a nation is like the expense of manage-
ment to the joint-tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to
contribute in proportion to their respective interests. In the ob-
servation or neglect of this maxim consists what is called the
* equality or inequality of taxation. Smith's Weal. Nations,
b. 5, c. 2, pt. 2; Vattel, b. 1. c. 20, s. 240. All taxes ought 254
to fall as equally as possible upon the fund which must finally pay
them. The rent of houses, though it, in some respects, resembles
the rent ol land is, in one point, essentially different. The rent
of land is paid for the use of a productive subject. The land which
pays it produces it. The rent of houses is paid for the use of an
unproductive subject. Consequently, a tax upon the rent of land
falls ultimately upon agriculture, whereas a tax upon the rent of
houses is paid finally from a revenue derived from the wages of
labor, the profits of stock, &c. No tax should, if practicable, be
allowed so to operate as to take away any part of the capital value
of property; because it thereby tends to diminish the funds des-
tined for the maintenance of productive labor. Smith's Weal.
Nations, b. 5, c. 2, pt. 2.

These general principles have been incorporated into our Decla-
ration of Rights, which declares, " that the levying taxes by the
poll is grievous and oppressive, and ought to be abolished; that
paupers ought not to be assessed for the support of government;
but every person in the State ought to contribute his proportion of
public taxes for the support of government, according to his actual
worth in real or personal property within the State; yet fines,
duties, or taxes may properly and justly be imposed, or laid with
a political view, for the good government and benefit of the com-
munity.'' Decla. Rights Mary. Art. 13; 1650, ch. 26, s. 3; Articles
Confed. Art. 8; 1 Madison's Papers, 250, 260, 502, 503, 506. The
restrictions and regulations as to the taxing power of the General
Assembly contained in this Article are of great importance; and