264 WILLIAMS' CASE.—3 BLAND.

It appears, that in New York, in cases of equity, where it be-
comes necessary, or it is agreed to award to a widow a compensa-
tion in lieu of her dower, it is the course of the Court to reter the
matter to a master in Chancery to have a gross sum liquidated
by the value of her life according to the tables of life annuities;
or to have the interest of one-third of the purchase money of the
estate secured to her tor her life; and yet it would seem, that the
gross sum to be awarded to her must be no more than equivalent
to the price of an annuity the same in amount as the annual rents
and profits of her dower. Tabele v. Tabele, 1 John. C. C. 45;
Hazen v. Thurber, 4 John. C. C. 604: Titus v. Neilson, 5 John. C. C.
458; Sicaine v. Ferine, 5 John. C. C. 491; Ererston v. Tappan, 5
John. C. C. 513; Hale v. James, 6 John. C. C. 263. In Virginia it
is said, that where the estate is sold, and the widow agrees to re-
eeive a gross sum in lieu of her dower, the Court must direct an
issue to have the amount ascertained: Pollard v. Underwood, 4
Hen. & Mun. 459; Davison v. Waite, 2 Mun. 527; which, however,
is only calling upon a jury to cut the knot, since they could not be
more capable than the Chancellor of drawing from the evidence
any settled precise idea of the value. Griffith v. Spralley, 1 Cox,
390. But if the widow refuses to accept a gross sum in lieu of her
dower, then, it is said, that one-third of the purchase money must
be set apart, and the interest thereof be paid to her annually
during her life. Herbert v. Wren, 7 Craw. 380. And in South
Carolina, where in equity an estate is sold, it is laid down, that a
reasonable compensation must be * allowed to the widow for
253 her dower, without referring to any principles by which the
amount of such compensation is to be ascertained by the master
in Chancery by whom it is to be adjusted. Miller v. Cape. I Desau.
110; Miller v. Miller, I Desau. 111: Clifford v. Clifford, 1 Desau.
115: Rutledge v. Williamson, 1 Desau. 159.

In Maryland there have been frequent and important occasions
for recurring to the doctrine of chances in regard to the expecta-
tion of human life as a means of ascertaining the value of life in-
terests in property; and the valuation of such interests has pre-
sented many and great difficulties to the minds of the legislative
as well as to those of the judicial department; and therefore, it
cannot be deemed amiss to bring together here all that is to be
found in the books of our Code in relation to this important matter.

An annual public tax upon land may, with propriety, be re-
garded, in most respects, as being of the same nature as a mere
incumbrance imposed upon it by its individual owner. It is evi-
dently one that bears upon it like the annual interest of a mort-
gage debt; which must be kept down by the particular tenant who
takes its rents and profits. But although that may be considered
as a correct mode of adjusting such a burthen as between a par-
ticular tenant, paying no rent, and a mere naked reversioner or