214 WILLIAMS' CASE.—3 BLAND.

* devisee from whom the body of the realty was taken. Cul-
197 pepper v. Aston, 2 Glum. C«s. 115; Oxenden v. Compton,2
Ves. Jun. 73; Maugham v. Mason, 1 Ves. & Bea. 415; Jones v.
Jones, 1 Bland, 4.52. And upon like ground of necessity to satisfy
the just claims of others, in partition cases, where it is impractica-
ble to make any just partition of the real estate, or where a parti-
tion cannot be made of it without much disadvantage, there, as
well by the long established power of the Court, as by positive
legislative enactment, real estate in which an infant has an inte-
rest in common with others may be sold, and a share ol the pro-
ceeds of the sale, consisting of personalty, may be awarded to the
infant. 1785. ch. 72, s. 12; 1820, ch. 191; Corse v. Polk, 1 Bland,
233, note.

The Courts of justice of England, acting in accordance with
these general principles and holding the rights of property, parti-
cularly those of an infant, to be in all respects sacred and inviola-
ble, but upon the ground of some great and overruling necessity,
have cautiously abstained from meddling with all such rights in
any way. And therefore it is, that the English Court of Chancery
has never, except in the eases above mentioned, undertaken to
dispose of an infant's land, or inheritance in real estate; and that,
although many cases have arisen, in which the income of an in-
fant's estate has been found to be entirely insufficient for his sup-
port; yet it has rarely occurred, that the Court has broken in upon
the capital of even his personal estate for the mere purpose of
maintenance, though it has frequently done so for his education
and putting him out in hie. Barlow v. Grant, 1 Vern. 255; Frank-
lin v. Green, 2 Vern. 137; Harvey v. Harvey, 2 P. Will. 21; Davies
v. Amten, 1 Ves. Jim. 248; S. C. 3 Bro. C. C. 178; Lee v. Brown,
4 Fes. 362; Walker v. Wetherell, 6 Ves. 474; Beasley v. Mat/rath, 2

against whom the bill shall be filed does not pay the sum due, by the time
limited in the decree, the mortgaged premises, or so much thereof as may
be necesbary to discharge the money due and costs, may be sold for ready
money, unless the plaintiff shall consent to a sale on credit; and the money
raised by such sale shall be ordered to be brought into Court to be paid to
the plaintiff.—(1785. ch. 72. s. 3; David v. Grahame, 2 H. & G. 94.)

It appears to have long been the understanding of the profession and of
this Court, as indicated in the above case of Jones v. Betsworth, and in other
cases, that the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property should be first
applied to the payment of the costs, commissions and expenses, and the
balance only to the satisfaction of the mortgage debt; or discounted from
the debt, should the mortgagee himself be the purchaser, leaving the mort-
gagee to proceed otherwise against the mortgagor for the recovery of so much
of the debt as was thus left unsatisfied.—(Ridgely v. Belt, 1805; Murdoch's
Case. 2 Bland, 464, 468,}— But in England it is otherwise; there, according
to a recent decision, the whole amount of the proceeds of the sale must be
first applied to the satisfaction of the mortgage debt.—(Upperton v. Ham-
son, 10 Cond. Chan. Rep. 139; Ellison v. Wright, 3 Cond. Chan. Rep. 482.)