WILLIAMS' CASE.—3 BLAND. 213

into personalty for the payment of debts; in all which cases, the
surplus, if any, goes as a residuum of the realty to the heir or

followed, that, in equity, the debtor might, within a reasonable time, redeem
his estate on the payment of the principal of the debt, with interest; and
that as the debtor might be allowed, on those terms, to redeem, the creditor
could not, after the day of payment, have his estate made perfectly absolute
without a bill to foreclose, the Court of equity, to which he was thus under
a necessity of addressing himself, for that purpose, might prescribe the
terms upon which his title should be made absolute; which, among other
things, should be, that the debtor should have a further specified time, after
the date of the decree, to pay the debt, with interest; and so redeem his
estate; and this specified time, on its being shewn that the mortgaged estate
greatly exceeded in value the amount of the debt, might, to prevent a sacri-
fice of the property, be from time to time enlarged to a reasonable extent.
(Pow. Mortg. 7, 108, 250, 961; 2 Mad. Chan. 493; Ismoord v. Claypool, 1 Cha.
Rep. 262; Monkhouse v. The Corporation of Bedford, 17 Ves. 380; Novosielski
v. Wakefield, 17 Ves. 418; Edwards v. Cunliffe, 1 Mad. Rep. 286; Parker v.
Housefield, 8 Cond. Chan. Rep. 63; Bruere v. Wharton, 10 Cond. Chan. Rep.
158.)

Such has always been the law of England; and in Maryland the same
principles of equity have prevailed, in so far as to aliow, for the same rea-
sons, on a decree to foreclose or sell, the further time of twelve or eighteen
months to the debtor to make payment.—(Carroll v. Belt, 1797; Burt v. The
Commissioners of Washington. 1806; Craig v. Rusk. 1807.)—But as I never
could satisfy myself of the propriety of thus extending the credit beyond
the date of the decree, to the prejudice of the creditor, to whom mere legal
interest could rarely be an adequate compensation for the delay of the pay-
ment of his money; (Reynolds v. Pitt, 19 Ves. 140;) and no such further in-
dulgence being allowed to the debtor in mortgage cases any where but in
England, where the practice of granting it has been regretted, and said to
be unreasonable.—(2 Mad. Chan. 492.)—I have in all cases deemed it proper
to limit the indulgence to one month, or to as short a time as was compatible
with the observance of the rule, as one which had been expressly recognized
by the General Assembly; (1785, ch. 72, s. 3;1 since there can be no more
just grounds for postponing the immediate execution of a decree in equity
for the recovery of a debt in a mortgage case, than in suspending execution
on a judgment at common law, in an action of debt on a bond under a stay
law, which has been held to be unconstitutional, because of its impairing
the obligation of the contract.—(Campbell's Case. 2 Bland, 237.)

But, in regard to infante, it has beea declared, that where any person
under twenty-one years of age, shall be possessed of any real estate mort-
gaged for securing the payment of any debt, and the day of payment has
elapsed, the Chancellor may decree a sale of the mortgaged premises, or such
part thereof as may be necessary to discharge the debt; or may decree a fore-
closure of the whole or such part of the mortgaged premises as may be suffi-
cient to satisfy the debt: and that too, as it would seem, without allowing
the infant a day to shew cause', or requiring the plaintiff as formerly, to
give bond to refund or reconvey, on its being made to appear within one
year after his arrival at age, that the decree was erroneous or unjust.—(1785,
ch. 73, s. 1 and 2; 1832, ch. 303, s. 8; 1837, ch. 292; Booth v. Rich, 1 Vern. 295;
Mattack v. Galton, 3 P. Will. 352; Winchester v. Beaver. 3 Ves. 317; William-
son v. Gordon, 19 Ves. 114.)—And it has further been declared, without dis-
tinction as to infants or adults, that in all cases to foreclose, in case the party