172 SALMON v. CLAGETT.—3 BLAND.

from the required discovery, without, or after he had failed to do
so by plea, seems to have been passed by, or wholly lost sight of.

It may be admitted, that a purchaser without notice stands in a
Court of equity, upon the highest and strongest grounds; yet the
course of the Court is not to be perverted, or thrown into confusion
for his behoof; he is to have justice; and the means whereby he
may obtain it are ample and open to him. He may plead the fact,
and thus avail himself of the advantage of his situation; and if he
fails to do so, or does so improperly , he must, like other negligent
persons, abide the consequences. Jerrard v. Saunders, 2 Ven.
Jun., 187, 454; Sugd. Vend. Purch. 553; Ovey v. Leighton, 1 Cond.
Cha. Rep. 433; Co. Lit. 303. And there is much reason why he
should be thus left to his fate, when it is recollected, that by a
plea of purchase for valuable consideration without notice, the
defendant tacitly admits, that he has no title; and thereby assumes
a position analogous to that of a witness who refuses to answer
lest he should criminate himself. Wolwyn v. Lee, 9 Ves. 33.

But we have seen, that, in general, after a plea has been over-
ruled, the defendant may insist on the same matter in his answer.
Therefore, if these exceptions are to be allowed to the extent laid
down, then the defendant's negation of the plaintiff's title; or alle-
gation, that he himself is a purchaser without notice; which is
thus to stand in the place of. and to do the business of a plea, will
amount in fact to a mere repetition of the same plea, without the
leave of the Court; and the controversy may be thus renewed and
reiterated for no one useful purpose. If a plea could be repeated,
it would not do its office, it would not have the effect of saving
* litigation, but encourage defendants to try it as a daily ex-
155 periment to gain time. Freeland v. Johnson, Antr. 410.
The case referred to, of the purchaser without notice, was in fact,
one of that kind. The defendant, in that very case, had pleaded
the fact of his being a purchaser without notice; and having failed
to sustain his plea, as a protection against the discovery required
of him, he presented the same matter in his answer for that pur-
pose, and succeeded. Jerrard v. Sauders, 2 Ves. Jun., 187, 454.

The adjudications upon which these exceptions to the rule rest,
stand opposed, however, by high and venerable authority. They
have never been respectfully acquiesced in; nor passed by, at any
time, without question or impeachment. They have introduced an
anomalous form of pleading; and have, to the extent of their bear-
ing, distracted the principles by which proceedings in Chancery
had been previously well regulated. According to the orderly and
regular course, a defendant is always expected to resort to a plea
as a means of introducing any negation of new matter on which
he proposes to rely, for the purpose of putting a stop to further
litigation, or of protecting himself from any useless, or injurious
disclosures; since it is much to be wished, that the plaintiff's title