SALMON v. CLAGETT—3 BLAND. 171

overthrowing the averments of the bill as to deprive the plaintiff
of the discovery he asks.

But these reasonings appear to be founded upon a much broader
and more extraordinary assumption; which is, that the defendant
has no other means of protecting himself against the most frivolous
and unfounded calls for disclosures, that may be attended with the
most injurious consequences to him. If there was the least ground
for this assumption the reasoning would be entitled to the greatest
respect; but it is utterly destitute of foundation. We have seen
that a defendant has the most ample means of protecting himself
from all unwarrantable calls for discovery, by either a demurrer, or
a plea; wh'ch he may mature, and advisedly rest upon; and which
even after argument he may have revised and amended to reach
and exactly to fit the merits of his case. Indeed, it is said, that
negative pleas were contrived expressly for the purpose of prevent-
ing this mischief. For, as it has been justly observed, any person
might, by alleging a title, however false, sustain a bill in equity
against any person for any thing, so far as to compel an answer;
and thus the title to every estate, the transactions of every com-
mercial house; and even the private transactions of every family
might be exposed; and this might be done in the name of a pau-
per, at the instance of others, and for the worst purposes. Beam's
Pleas Equ. 130.

This is a frightful view of the extent to which an unlimited
right to call for a discovery by means of a bill in equity might be
carried. But what is the remedy? A plea. This is not all. The
reasons are here strongly presented to shew the great value and
importance of pleas; not only as the commensurate and appro-
priate remedy or preventative, but as the sole and exclusive one.
For it is not said, that if the party fails to betake himself to this
shelter, he may find protection by anything he can allege by way
of answer; on the contrary, if he waives or is driven from his plea,
we are told, that he will be then met by the rule which commands
him to answer as fully as the bill requires. Prac. Reg, 275.

* There appears to be some stress laid upon the peculiar
claims which, it is said, a purchaser without notice has upon 154
the Court for its protection. And, from a careful consideration of
the only case in which any reasons are to be found for the deci-
sions which sanction this, as one of the exceptions to the rule, the
Court seems, in its anxiety to take due care of that favored char-
acter, to have entirely skipped over the previous question; whether
the defendant was, in truth, such a purchaser or not; and, taking
it for granted, that he really was such a person, to have gone on to
declaim upon the very eminent standing of such a character in a
Court of equity. The true and only question before the Court
was, whether a defendant, who had, in his answer, averred, that
he was a purchaser without notice, could thus protect himself