154 SALMON v. CLAGETT.—3 BLAND.

of equity arise, upon which he asks relief; or, as I have said upon
a former occasion, the plaintiff's case, as stated by himself, must,
in substance, or in some essential bearing, have such a character
as will confer jurisdiction on a Court of Chancery; it must appear
to be an equitable, as contradistinguished from a mere legal cause
of suit. The bill must itself shew why it was necessary, or allow-
able for the plaintiff to leave the ordinary legal tribunal and come
into a Court of Chancery for relief. Estep v. Watkins, 1 Bland, 489.
For, the justice of the Republic is distributed, by the Constitution,
into particular Courts, which should not be confounded. Brown v.
Bradshaw, Prec. Cha. 156; 4 Inst. 71. The bill may assert, that such
and such principles of equity arise out of the facts stated, which en-
title the plaintiff to relief; but it is for the Court alone to determine
how far they are applicable or correct. The case of the plaintiff,
then consists merely of tacts, ex facto oritur jus. Consequently
the bill calls on the defendant to speak *of, and about facts;
135 thus, if the bill states facts which amount to constructive
notice, it is not enough for the defendant to deny notice, he must
answer to the facts which constitute the notice. Jerrard v. Saun-
ders, 2 Ves. Jun. 187.

A defendant who conies into Court; and, in any manner, meets
and opposes, or admits the complaint made against him, may be
said to answer it. If he demurs to the bill, he admits the facts;
but avers, that none of those principles, for which the plaintiff
contends, do so arise from them as to entitle him to relief; and
thus the complaint is answered. If the defendant by waj of plea,
says he has paid the debt claimed by the plaintiff; and asserts that
fact as his defence; he gives a legal answer to the complaint. But
the bill itself calls upon the defendant to speak to facts, and a
mere denial of facts is proper for such an answer, but not for a
plea. Milligan v. Milledge, 3 Cran. 220; As to this matter, see Wag-
ram on Discovery, 8, &c.

It is therefore perfectly evident, that neither a demurrer, nor a
plea is that sort of answer which the bill requires; because they
neither of them say one word about the matter of fact stated in the
bill, or speak of them in the manner they are there treated. The
demurrer takes them for true, and answers, by averring, that they
constitute no ground for relief. A plea in equity, like a special
plea at law, most usually admits, or rather supposes, all that is set
forth in the bill to be true; Plunket v. Penson, 2 Atk. 54; Roche v.
Morgell, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 727; Tompkins v. Ashby, 22 Com. Lmc Rep.
239; but states other facts which produce an equity, which dis-
places that arising from the facts stated by the bill; or, the plea,
an incongruous kind of one, affirms the validity of that, as a re-
lease or the like, the dissolution of which is sought, denying the
circumstances upon which its legality is impeached by the bill.