SALMON v. CLAGETT—3 BLAND. 153

tute a sufficient answer to it; such a one as entitles them to rest
their defence upon, by way of answer, without making any farther
disclosures, and also to a dissolution of the injunction.

If these positions are well founded, then indeed the defendants
must be allowed all the benefit they claim from them. But al-
though it may be admitted, that these allegations would, at the
hearing, if sustained by proof, constitute a complete defence
against the pretensions of the plaintiff', yet at this stage of the
controversy they present other considerations, and involve princi-
ples of a different complexion.

I have never before been called upon to consider these posi-
tions; and on looking into the books, I find the adjudications to
have been much more discordant than I had supposed; and that
the principles and rules of practice, in relation to this matter, jet
remain to be settled. That we may have a. clear and distinct view
of the nature and extent of the subject, I shall endeavor, briefly
to explain, and illustrate such points and distinctions in regard to
the course of proceedings in Chaucerv, as have a bearing upon the
matters I am now called upon to decide.

The learning of the law is so chained together, that it can only
be well understood in its several parts; or in any manner safely
applied to new cases as they arise, by clearly apprehending and
* constantly recurring to its reason. Ratio est anima legis. 134
Co. Litt. 394. The reason and spirit of cases make law, not
the letter of particular precedents. Fisher v. Prince, 3 Burr. 1364.
The law does not consist in particular cases, but in general prin-
ciples which run through the cases and govern the decision of
them. Rust v. Cooper, Cowp. 632. All doubtful points are decided
by an application of general principles to the particular ease. Silk
v. Prime, 1 Bro. C. C. 138. It is the office of an expositor of the
law to make such a construction as not only to reconcile the same
author with himself; but also to remove all apparent jars and con-
flicts, that may be found to exist among the various reported judg-
ments upon the same subject, so that all, if possible, may stand
together. The Case of Fines, 3 Co. 84. It is also necessary con-
stantly to bear in mind, that the names of things are for avoiding
of contusion diligently to be observed. Nomina si nescis; perit cog-
nitio rernm. Et nomina si perdas, certe distirectio rerum perditur.
Co. Litt. 86, b. A confusion of terms in any science tends to con-
found the science itself, by destroying that precision of ideas, that
distinction amongst objects, which is the very groundwork of
all knowledge. Therefore, without considering the weight of
names, I shall look to the reasons given for the several judgments
it may become necessary for me to notice and examine. Doe. v.
Lancashire, 5 T. R. 62.

A plaintiff should, in his bill, set forth, in a brief, but clear man-
ner, all the iacts and circumstances out of which those principles