618 ANDREWS v. SCOTTON—2 BLAND.

Some live and twenty years ago, it happened, that a purchaser
under a decree of this Court, became a bankrupt; and the solicitor,
under an impression that relief could only be had by a regular
suit, brought a bill, in which it Is stated, that the land had been
sold on a credit, and bonds taken of the purchaser, with a surety,
to secure the purchase money, that the bonds were, by order of
this Court, assigned by the trustee to the complainant; that the
purchaser had been regularly declared a bankrupt; and that the
surety was insolvent. The purchaser and his assignees only, were
made defendants. The bill prayed, that the sale might be an-
nulled, that the bonds might be cancelled, and for general relief.
The assignee answered and admitted the fact, and the bill was
taken pro confesso against the purchaser. Upon which, the Chan-
cellor, in his decree of the 7th of July, 1808, concisely observes,
that "although the complainant might obtain relief in another
way, and the neglect or refusal to pay money due for property sold,
is not alone, a sufficient * ground to set aside a sale;" yet,
652 considering the circumstances of that case, the sale was
annulled, and the bonds cancelled as prayed. Simpson v. Ham-
mond, per KILTY, Chancellor. In this respect, there, are but two
modes of proceeding in Chancery, the regular and the summary way.
The other way of which the Chancellor speaks, in this regular case
by bill, must, therefore, be understood to mean the summary way
by petition, for process of attachment against the purchaser, or
for a resale, grounded on the equitable lien; which latter, must
have been that other way, particularly alluded to. For, he cer-
tainly could not have referred to an action at common law, on the
bond against this bankrupt purchaser, and his insolvent surety.

In the year 1821, a case occurred in this Court, in which the
party interested, applied for. and actually obtained relief, in that
other way, alluded to, as it is believed, by the Chancellor, in his
decree of 1808. After the ratification of the sale, the purchaser
had neglected and refused to pay the purchase money. Upon a
petition of the trustee, representing the fact, the Court passed an
order commanding the purchaser to pay by an appointed day, or
shew cause, or on default, an attachment would be ordered. The
party made default, and an attachment was ordered. After
which, the money was paid. Bolte v. Biays, 15th March, 1821, per
KILTY, Chancellor.

The defence of this purchaser, in this case, is that the parties
can only obtain redress by bill in equity or a suit at law. He has
already, by petition prayed relief of this Court; and after having
obtained its decision in that form, and had that decision submitted
to the revision of the Court in the last resort, it surely ought not to
be expected, that these tribunals would again consider and adju-
dicate upon that cause of controversy, if presented in a new shape,
and merely put into the form of a suit by bill. The jurisdiction of