ANDREWS v. SCOTTON.—2 BLAND. 617

Hence, it appears to have been the decided opinion of Lord
Hardwicke, long- before our Bevolution, not only that a purchaser,
after the sale had been ratified, might be compelled to pay the pur-
chase money by process of attachment for contempt; but that there
was, in fact, no other remedy; since it is clear, that no action at
common law, could be maintained against the purchaser, grounded
merely on the order in Chancery confirming the sale. And this
was cited by Lord Eldon, in 1805, with approbation, as being en-
tirely sound in its principles. Ex parte Minor, 11 Ves. 562; Casa-
major v. Strode, 1 Cond. Cka. Rep. 195; Bligh v. Darnley, 2 P. Will.
620; Carpenter v, Thornton, 5 Com. Law Hep. 225.

A doubt was expressed upon this subject, in a case on the equity
side of the Court of Exchequer, in the year 1793, when, on the
Court's being referred to a similar proceeding in Chancery, which
had taken place in the year 1787, an order was made, after the con-
firmation of the sale, that the purchaser should be compelled to
complete his purchase. Cunningham v. Williams, 2 Amtr. 344; S.
C. 2 Fowl. Each. Pra. 268, 272. But in the year 1808, the in-
stances in which the Court of Chancery had exercised such a
power, seems to have been again almost forgotten. Anonymous, 2
Ves. Jun. 336. The Chancellor expressed * some doubt, but
on being referred to a case which arose in the year 1791, he 651
made the order, that the purchaser should pay his purchase money
within a fortnight, or stand committed; observing, that the prin-
ciple required it equally in the case of a purchaser, who could not
be permitted to baffle the Court, and disobey an order, more than
any other person. Lansdown v. Elderton, 14 Ves. 512; Ex parte
Cranmer, 2 Collinson on Idiots, 705.

From these authorities it appears to have been the settled law
of the English Court of Chancery long before, and ever since our
Eevolution, that on a purchaser's failing to comply, the Court
would, on application, after the ratification of the sale, compel
him to complete his purchase by process of attachment for con-
tempt.

But it has happened in this State as in England, that the evi-
dence of the existence of this power, so important and so neces-
sary to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, has been many
times almost forgotten, and the propriety of the power itself has
been as often doubted or opposed.(l} There is no instance in this
State of a deposit ever having been exacted of a bidder, before
the ratification of the sale; and therefore, if a purchaser cannot be
coerced by process of attachment, this Court has no hold of him;
nor can it ever take hold of him, in any manner, so as to prevent
him from making a mere sport of its decrees.

(l) It is true, that the law sometimes sleeps, and judgment wakens it; for,
dormit aliquando lex moritur nunquam.—Mary Portengton's Case, 10 Co. 43.